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1 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF 
NETWORKS 
DR. HENRY FRASER* 
ABSTRACT 
The past 25 years have seen a ‘turn to culture’ in copyright scholarship. 
This cultural turn has produced an expansive account of copyright’s 
disadvantages with respect to qualitative cultural and political goals such 
as: promoting democracy, individual self-authorship, expressive diversity, 
and a more inclusive creative and discursive culture. A common view among 
proponents of the cultural turn is that copyright stands in the way of the 
democratization of creative and discursive spheres online. This article 
challenges that view. 
Online ‘free’ content economies—characterized by peer production, 
decentralized selection, and peer to peer content sharing—have not lived up 
to the hopes of cultural turn thinkers. I focus on structural matters 
(structures of incentive and structures of power), critically applying 
descriptive and normative frameworks of the cultural turn. 
Proponents of the cultural turn have been concerned about copyright’s 
role in concentrating cultural power. They should also be concerned about 
concentrations of cultural and communicative power in ‘free content’ 
economies. If they were concerned that commercial incentives under 
copyright regimes privileged bland and homogeneous content, they should 
also be concerned about the troubling incentives at play in online economies 
where free content is used to harvest user attention and sell advertisements. 
This is not to say we should aim for maximalist copyright online. I show 
that both expansions of exceptions and limitations to copyright, and 
 
*    Independent researcher – Graduated with. D.Phil from the University of Oxford, 2018. I 
would like to thank the following people for their helpful advice, comments and criticism regarding this 
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Genevieve Wilkinson. 
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measures that strengthen copyright owners’ exclusive rights, may entrench 
problematic incentives and power structures both online and off. We should 
therefore carefully assess how developments in law affect structures of 
power and incentive in the creative sphere as a whole, whether they formally 
‘weaken’ copyright or ‘strengthen’ it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright pessimism and internet optimism 
Pessimism about copyright, and optimism about the potential of the 
internet to democratize cultural production, tend to go hand in hand. Over 
the past 25 years, copyright scholarship has taken a ‘cultural turn’.1 Where 
traditional copyright scholarship focuses on balancing incentives for 
creativity against the need for access to works, the cultural turn is 
characterized by concern with copyright’s influence on the quality and 
character of culture. The cultural turn has produced an expansive account of 
copyright’s disadvantages with respect to qualitative cultural and political 
goals. These include the promotion of democracy, individual self-authorship, 
expressive diversity, and inclusiveness in the distribution of power to shape 
culture and discourse.2 
The same body of literature has also produced a fairly rosy picture of 
internet culture, especially ‘free’ content economies characterized by peer 
production, creative remixing, decentralized selection, and peer to peer 
sharing of content.3 Professor Yochai Benkler was perhaps the leading 
 
 1.  See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1397–
1561 (2013). 
 2.  See, e.g.: Anne Barron, Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom, 31 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 1 (2012); Barton Beebe, Bleistein, the Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of 
American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2017); YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF 
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Anupam 
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Copyright’s Cultural Turn, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1397–1561 (2013); M. Chon, 
Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); JULIE E. COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); 
ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (2015); C. J. CRAIG, COPYRIGHT, 
COMMUNICATION, AND CULTURE: RE-IMAGINING THE COPYRIGHT MODEL (2006).; Niva Elkin-Koren, 
What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann, Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual 
Progress: Toward a Human Flourishing Theory for Intellectual Property, 14 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 2 (2017); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the 
Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-
Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW 
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 463–483 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); 
Neil Natanel, Copyright’s Paradox (2008); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, YALE L.J.  1–60 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: 
Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101 (2008); M. Wong, Toward an Alternative 
Normative Framework for Copyright: from Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 775 (2008).  
 3.  Some proponents of the cultural turn, such as Professor Netanel, have been more skeptical of 
internet culture. See e.g. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395–498 (2000). Netanel has also offered impressive, 
nuanced accounts of copyright’s role in promoting democratic civil society, even as it contributes to 
problematic market hierarchies which have negative effects on freedom of expression. See e.g. Neil 
Netanel, Is the Commercial Mass Media Necessary, or Even Desirable, for Liberal Democracy?, 
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exponent of this optimistic view (though his views have subsequently 
changed).4 He wrote, in his important and impressive book on The Wealth of 
Networks: 
“By creating sources of information and communication facilities 
that no one owns or exclusively controls, the networked information 
economy removes some of the most basic opportunities for 
manipulation of those who depend on information and 
communication by the owners of the basic means of communications 
and the producers of the core cultural forms. It does not eliminate the 
possibility that one person will try to act upon another as object. But 
it removes the structural constraints that make it impossible to 
communicate at all without being subject to such action by others.”5 
Benkler’s view (one shared by numerous cultural turn theorists of copyright) 
was that networked peer production, and de-propertization of works online, 
promised a culture that is more inclusive and democratic; more expressively 
diverse; less susceptible to control and manipulation at a single source; and 
more affirming of free choice and expression, than mass media culture 
underwritten by proprietary copyright.6 
Online free content economies have not, however, been living up to 
their promise. Every month seems to bring another government report, news 
story or book detailing the ills of the online world of information and 
discourse.7 The public, globally, is becoming more aware of: 
 
ORKING PAPER TPRC CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTERNET POLICY 
(2001), http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0109092 (last visited Feb 24, 2014); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright 
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 THE YALE L.J 283–387 (1996). As a general rule, however, 
culturally oriented theories of copyright have tended toward copyright pessimism and internet 
optimism.  
      4.   Regarding these changes, see below note 31 and accompanying text. 
 5.  BENKLER, supra note 2, at 465. 
 6.  See e.g. Hunter and Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1018: “The destruction of copyright industries 
would be a terrible thing if, and only if, they represented the sole means that creative content could be 
generated. As we have seen, however, amateur-to-amateur functions now provide individuals with the 
opportunity to express themselves, and society has already benefited greatly from this expanded content 
generation. The next few years promise to provide even greater opportunities for this sort of content. As 
a result, society as a whole is likely to be better off if we allow for widespread decentralization of all 
content functions.” See also, e.g.: LESSIG, supra note 2; Giancarlo Frosio, Re-Imagining Digital 
Copyright Through the Power of Imitation: Lessons from Confucius and Plato, 5 PEKING UNIVERSITY 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 55–106 (2017); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of 
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263–324 (2002); 
Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: the Overlaoded Impact of 
Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785–856 (2004). 
 7.  See e.g. Frances Cairncross, The Cairncross Review: a Sustainable Future for Journalism 
(2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-cairncross-review-a-sustainable-future-for-
journalism (last visited Feb 15, 2019); Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ONLINE HARMS WHITE 
PAPER (2019), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7933
60/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf./; RENEE DIRESTA ET AL., The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet 
Research Agency: Independent Report to the US Senate Intelligence Committee; Rosie Perper, New 
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• the extreme concentration of wealth and power in the hands of 
a few internet platforms;8 
• exploitative and often unauthorized surveillance, harvesting, 
processing and disclosure of personal data;9 
• mobbing, shaming and cyberbullying on social media;10 
• polarization and incivility in online discourse;11 
• the proliferation of conspiracy theories and fake news;12 and 
• high profile ‘hacking’ of democratic process and public 
discourse through propaganda and provocation on social 
media, skillfully couched in the vocabulary of ‘meme’ and 
‘remix’ culture.13 
This article explores some of these problems in online free content 
economies, and the structural pressures underlying them. 
In focusing on structural matters—structures of incentive, structures of 
power— I am adopting a descriptive framework that is firmly rooted in the 
cultural turn. That framework has a strong flavor of political economy. 
Proponents of the cultural turn – Benkler and Professor Neil Netanel 
foremost among them—have produced an impressive picture of copyright’s 
role in organizing the production, dissemination and use of works; and 
allocating wealth and cultural power as it does so.14 They have shown how 
 
Zealand’s Privacy Commissioner Lashes Out at Facebook, Calling Those Behind the Company 
“Morally Bankrupt Pathological Liars”, BUSINESS INSIDER AUSTRALIA (2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/new-zealand-privacy-commissioner-calls-facebook-morally-
bankrupt-pathological-liars-2019-4 (last visited Apr 10, 2019). 
 8.  See e.g. Chris Anderson & Michael Wolff, The Web is Dead: Long Live the Internet, WIRED 
(2010), http://www.wired.com/2010/08/ff_webrip/. 
 9.  See e.g. Jaron Lanier, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
RIGHT NOW (2018); Kevin, Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as 
Fallout Widens, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html. 
 10.  See e.g. Jon Ronson, Jon Ronson: How the Online Hate Mob Set its Sights on Me, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/dec/20/social-media-twitter-
online-shame. 
 11.  See e.g. Farhad Manjoo, Web Trolls Winning as Incivility Increases, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/15/technology/web-trolls-winning-as-incivility-
increases.html. 
 12.  See e.g. Guardian Staff & Agencies, Washington Gunman Motivated by Fake News 
“Pizzagate” Conspiracy, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/dec/05/gunman-detained-at-comet-pizza-restaurant-was-self-investigating-fake-news-
reports?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other. 
 13.  DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 7.  
 14.  See e.g. Y. Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the 
Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245–1276 (2003); Netanel, 
supra note 3; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free 
Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000); NETANEL, supra note 2; LESSIG, supra note 2.  
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strong copyright contributes to a troubling concentration of wealth and 
communicative power in the hands of large corporate copyright businesses—
a concentration / inclusiveness critique of copyright.15 They also make a 
blandness / diversity critique of copyright, which boils down to the charge 
that copyright contributes to perverse commercial incentives which reward 
bland, lowest common denominator content at the expense of more diverse, 
controversial and creative fare.16 
The more general insight here is that the political economy of 
copyright—what Netanel calls its ‘structural function’—exerts an influence 
on what works are created, what disseminated, by whom, for whom, and 
under what financial and material conditions. Copyright gives rise to the 
operation of a price mechanism. This, in turn, allows market forces and 
hierarchies to shape the way in which rights to use works, and wealth derived 
from the commercial exploitation of works, are allocated.17 As a 
consequence it creates a set of institutional and cultural constraints which 
shape the quality and the character of the creative sphere.18 
But the same holds true for any system for organizing production, 
selection, dissemination, consumption, exploitation and use of creative 
material. However these activities are organized, a set of institutional and 
practical parameters will come into play. These will shape incentives, 
distribute wealth and power, create hierarchies of one kind or another, and 
ultimately influence creative activity. Freedom (or relative freedom) from 
the constraints of copyright is therefore not a sufficient condition for a 
culture of uncommodified creativity that enhances individual flourishing or 
effective, robust, respectful deliberation. 
Indeed, disintermediation of content industries, and free circulation of 
works plays a key role in facilitating troubling structures of incentive and 
power online. Jaron Lanier sums up the structural conditions in the online 
 
 15.  Copyright industries are characterized by supply side concentration and winner take all 
markets. Under the auspices of copyright a small, vertically integrated group of commercial 
intermediaries—publishers, record labels, film studios, and so on—has considerable power to mediate 
what comes before the public. e.g. LESSIG, supra note 2 at 10, 73; NETANEL, supra note 2, at 110; 
BENKLER, supra note 2, at 370-374. 
 16.  See e.g. NETANEL, supra note 2,  at 137; Ruth Towse, Copyright and Artists: a View from 
Cultural Economics, 20 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS 567, 570 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright 
and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000), 9; L. P. Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning 
Incentives With Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection (2008), 
http://works.bepress.com/lydia_loren/1/; Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use, supra note 14, at 
379-380; Tushnet, supra note 2, at 115. 
 17.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the” Betamax” Case and its Predecessors, COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613  (1982).  
 18.  Julie E Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, THE 
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW (last visited Jan. 
24, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=756484; COHEN, supra note 2, at 26. 
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world of free content with characteristic wryness: “Sometimes information 
is supposedly free but people are subject to weird surveillance and influence 
with insufficient commensurate rights.”19 Oligopolistic internet platforms 
such as social networks and search engines use free content to draw 
individuals onto their platforms and take advantage of powerful network 
effects.20 These platforms then use data harvesting and surveillance to 
maximize the time that users spend on the platform; to sell advertising; and, 
in some cases, to sell personal data that permits third parties secretly to use 
powerful insights to influence individuals’ opinions, spending and political 
outlook.21 
Algorithms designed to maximize user engagement do not prioritize 
diversity, individual self-authorship, inclusive distributions of 
communicative power, or open, productive discourse and deliberation. 
Rather, they have tended to produce ‘filter bubbles’, characterized by 
addictive interfaces, and content that drives impulsive clicks, sparks outrage, 
and corrals internet users into groups of like-minded interlocutors.22 
In short, online free content economies have produced many benefits, 
but they have also contributed to distributions of wealth and communicative 
power, and conditions in the marketplace of ideas, which seem little better 
than those for which scholars like Benkler criticized over-reaching 
copyright.23 
To say so, however, begs the question of how we are judging what is 
‘better’. Here again, I wholeheartedly adopt the normative framework of the 
cultural turn: the same framework underlying the concentration and 
blandness critiques of copyright. Let me now set that framework out in a 
little more detail. 
 
 19.  Jaron Lanier, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? (2014), 246. 
 20.  Jonathan Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commodification, Bundling and Concentration (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2916859. 
 21.  See e.g. Carole Cadwalladr, The Great British Brexit Robbery: How Our Democracy Was 
Hijacked, THE OBSERVER (May 7, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-
great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy. See also Julie Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the 
Practical Inevitability of Law, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85–96 (2019). 
 22.  Eli Pariser, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011), 37ff. See 
also Cohen, supra note 21 at 88. 
 23.  Guy Pessach, Beyond IP — The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post-IP Era, 54 
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 225 (2017); Guy Pessach, Some Realism About Copyright Skepticism, 
57 IDEA: THE IP LAW REVIEW 227 (2017). 
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Critically applying the values of the cultural turn to online free 
content economies 
Cultural turn scholars assess copyright by reference to its effects on 
culture, discourse, the information sphere and, ultimately, collective and 
individual choice-making. Proponents of this turn to culture espouse a set of 
goals that goes beyond copyright’s traditional goal of incentivizing the 
production and dissemination of works of authorship, or maximizing utility 
in markets for those works. 
They draw heavily on deliberative democratic theory, and the human 
capabilities school of development economics.24  The high-level goals that 
emerge from these normative frameworks are democracy and self-
authorship. That is to say, proponents of the cultural approach argue that the 
aim of any information policy measures, including copyright, is to facilitate 
conditions in the sphere of culture and public discourse which: 
• are conducive to productive democratic deliberation;25 
• help individuals to cultivate their capabilities to the fullest, and 
to author their lives with real autonomy;26 
• or both. 
Second order objectives follow fairly logically from these first order 
commitments. Key among these are diversity and inclusiveness. 
Both effective democratic deliberation and meaningful self-authorship 
require diversity and inclusiveness in the information environment. 
Individuals will not flourish, and nor will democracy, unless members of the 
public are exposed to a diverse range of perspectives and aesthetics 
 
 24.  The deliberative democratic paradigm characteristic of the cultural turn is rooted in what John 
Dryzek describes as a ‘deliberative turn’ in political philosophy. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS (2002). The fundamental principle 
underlying the deliberative democratic paradigm is that democratic decision-making will not be optimal 
unless informed by robust, pluralistic, inclusive civil society and public discussion. See e.g.  CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) at ix. Human 
capabilities analysis turns on the question: ‘what are people able to do and be?’ It is built on the work of 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. According to Nussbaum, the extent to which an individual lives 
the good life is determined by the individual’s opportunities to realise their human capabilities to the 
fullest. See e.g. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES (2011), 4; Martha Nussbaum, 
Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECONOMICS 33–59 
(2003). 
 25.  In copyright theory, the deliberative paradigm is best exemplified in the work of Professor 
Neil Netanel who developed an impressive theory of copyright’s relationship to democratic civil society 
over the course of a series of articles beginning in 1996, and culminating in a book on copyright and 
free expression in 2008. See e.g., Netanel, supra note 3 and NETANEL, supra note 2. 
 26.  See e.g. COHEN, supra note 2 at 12; BENKLER, supra note 2 at 273; Lessig, supra note 2 at 
21-24; Beebe, supra note 2 at 344; O. B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation and 
Context, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 477, 518 (2007); Margaret Chon, Postmodern Progress: Reconsidering 
the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993).   
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(diversity).27 By the same token, the distribution of power and opportunity to 
shape and participate in culture must be reasonably democratic to ensure that 
the public sphere is capable of capturing the perspectives and opinions of the 
public (inclusiveness).28 The more open a decision or deliberation to multiple 
perspectives and possibilities, the better formulated and richer it is capable 
of being.29 This is true as much for individual choices (self-authorship) as 
for collective (democratic) ones. 
I have just given a snapshot of key normative concerns of the cultural 
turn in copyright theory: self-authorship and deliberative democracy as high 
order goals; diversity and inclusiveness as second-order means to these ends. 
In the first prat of this article, I critically apply this normative framework to 
online free content economies in order to reconsider the copyright minimalist 
/ internet optimist outlook that I described above.  I focus in particular to the 
activity on dominant internet platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Google 
and Twitter because the majority of individual internet users’ online activity 
is mediated through such platforms.30 
I point out a number of ways in which structural conditions in this 
supposedly ‘democratized’ information environment produce serious 
problems for expressive diversity, the inclusiveness of culture and, 
consequently, individual self-authorship and democracy. I argue, for 
example, that: 
• as in mass media settings, attention, communicative power, and 
the control over the means of selecting and filtering content, is 
highly concentrated on the internet, which is bad for 
inclusiveness; and 
• online filtration tools like search engines and newsfeeds have 
in certain ways reduced, rather than expanded, the range and 
diversity of expression to which individuals are exposed online, 
by producing ‘filter bubbles’ and promoting ‘group 
polarization’. 
The cyber-utopian vision of a vibrantly democratic, inclusive, expressively 
diverse internet, delivering accurate information, high quality discourse, and 
 
 27.   BENKLER, supra note 2 at 150-51.  
 28.  Id. at 182. For more on the significance for individual capabilities of inclusiveness, ‘semiotic 
democracy’ and opportunities to ‘play’ with cultural artefacts, see e.g. Fisher III, supra note 2 at 1216; 
Beebe, supra note 2 at  245ff; Arewa, supra note 26 at 481, 505, 525; Cohen, supra note 18 at 143, 146; 
Elkin-Koren, supra note 2 at 378, 399; Craig, supra note 2 at 33-35; Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of 
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumption, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 539 (2009).  
 29.  Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, 21 THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY  (2004). 
 30.  Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8. For more data about the reach of these dominant 
applications, see infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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rigorously and richly realized art, is inspiring. It even holds true in some 
quarters of the internet – for example the incredibly rich universe of 
podcasting. It does not, however, account for a raft of troubling dynamics 
plaguing online free content economies in recent years. 
 To make these observations is, of course, not to dismiss the virtues of 
the internet wholesale. On the contrary, the object of this article is to try to 
direct our aspirations productively, to realize the potential of the online 
content sphere to enhance democracy and self-authorship. 
 In any case, many cultural turn thinkers are by now well aware their 
hopes have not been fulfilled. Skepticism about internet utopianism has 
increased.31 Even so, it is worthwhile to assess critically the internet optimist 
/ copyright pessimist view in its ‘pure’ form, as it found voice in the first 
decade of this century, in order clearly and systematically to work out what 
has gone awry. Benkler has recently observed that, rather than attaining the 
freedom-maximizing internet he hoped for, we are shifting to an internet that 
facilitates the accumulation and concentration of power in the hands of a few 
agents.32 “If we are to preserve the democratic and creative promise of the 
Internet”, he writes,  
“we must continuously diagnose control points as they emerge and 
devise mechanisms of recreating diversity of constraint and degrees 
of freedom in the network to work around these forms of 
reconcentrated power.”33 
An important part of that process, painful though it may be, is to catalogue 
and analyze the disappointments of networks.  
 More to the point, I will argue that many of the problems online are 
connected with the structures of power and incentive that subsist in online 
 
31. See e.g., Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 DAEDALUS 18–32 
(2016). Benkler now acknowledges (at 20) that “Several developments suggest that we are shifting to 
an Internet that facilitates the accumulation of power by a relatively small set of influential state and 
nonstate actors.” See also, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over 
Power, 18 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 137–142 (2019); James Boyle, The Past and Future of 
the Internet: A Symposium For John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 1–4 
(2019). See below note 46 and accompanying text for further discussion of Benkler’s gradually 
changing views. Perhaps the most impressive work on this subject is Professor Julie Cohen’s. Cohen 
has developed her thinking from emphasizing the need for free ‘play’ with creative content as  
paramount, to now observing that internet users’ creative engagements with content now serves as raw 
material for commercial exploitation by powerful online platforms. See, respectively, Cohen, supra note 
2. and Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: the Legal Construction of the Surveillance 
Economy, 31 PHILOS. TECHNOL. 213–233 (2018). 
32.  Benkler, supra note 31. 
33.  Id., 18. 
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free content economies - often characterized by  the absence of strong 
copyright, or attenuation of its enforceability; by peer to peer content 
sharing; and distributed/decentralized methods of selecting and 
disseminating works. It is not just that internet utopia has failed to manifest: 
it is that the explosion of free content has been a big part of the problem; in 
many, overlapping ways. This theme needs more emphasis and elaboration 
in copyright scholarship. 
Practical implications 
The second part of this article sets out some practical implications of 
my analysis. One of the consequences of the cultural turn has been a 
tendency to focus on the need to expand copyright exceptions and 
limitations, and to avoid expansion of copyright’s strength, scope and 
duration.34 For example, the Australian Productivity Commission said in its 
2016 report on copyright: 
“Given the asymmetric nature of how [copyright] policy can be 
changed, the Commission considers it is appropriate to ‘err on the 
side of caution’ where there is imperfect information, and 
consciously set weaker parameters in the way that rights are assigned, 
used or enforced.”35 
This is a government agency, framing copyright minimalism as the sober and 
responsible outlook on copyright policy. The implication is that maintaining 
strong copyright that would be the riskier course. 
The analysis in this article suggests that weakening copyright and 
expanding exceptions and limitations may also produce structural risks, 
along with troubling asymmetries of wealth and cultural power. The 
concentration and blandness critiques of copyright that I summarized above 
might just as readily be applied to online free content economies. This has 
something to do with the incentives that operate when works are distributed 
and shared relatively free of copyright constraints, with the aim of capturing 
user attention, harvesting data, and selling advertising.36 In other words, the 
need for caution goes both ways. 
Of course, drawing this conclusion does not mandate a knee-jerk re-
commitment to maximalist copyright online. The concentration and 
 
 34.  See e.g. James Boyle, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2009), 
http://works.bepress.com/james_boyle/26/ (last visited Oct 29, 2013); Giancarlo F. Frosio, Resisting the 
Resistance: Resisting Copyright and Promoting Alternatives, 25 4 (2017).  
 35.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ARRANGEMENTS - PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY REPORT, 
(2016), http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/intellectual-property/report. 
 36.  For a sketch of this argument, see Pessach, supra note 23. 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
2019 The Disappointments of Networks 13 
blandness critiques of maximalist copyright (described above) are well 
taken. 
What we need is a unified picture of the structural and qualitative 
challenges that affect the marketplace of ideas and the cultural and creative 
spheres. Both copyright and non-copyright systems evince inclusiveness and 
diversity problems, just as each has some advantages for inclusiveness and 
diversity. In both copyright markets and online non-copyright systems, 
perverse incentives reward bland or sensationalist content.  Both online and 
off, and in copyright and networked-peer-production systems, a small group 
of powerful platforms hold a disturbing amount of power of the contents and 
character of the marketplace of ideas.37 
This observation has many implications, but I will focus here on one. 
Developments to copyright law, whether they have the effect of formally 
‘weakening’ or ‘strengthening’ the exclusive right, must be attuned to the 
structural parameters that ultimately determine their practical effect. 
The second part of the article is therefore devoted to illustrating how 
such a mindset might inform our thinking about copyright policy. I will first 
reflect on how certain expansions of the fair use exception in the US may, 
perversely, compound existing concentrations of cultural and 
communicative power, rather than alleviating them. I suggest that the 
development of fair use doctrine needs to take into account the ways in which 
dominant online platforms use the free circulation of works to harvest user 
attention, and thereby increase their communicative power both with respect 
to copyright owners, and to users. 
Then, for the sake of balance, I will consider the structural drawbacks 
of new developments in European copyright law. European Union legislators 
are perhaps the first to take seriously the negative structural consequences of 
‘safe harbor’ exceptions and limitations to copyright online. Article 17 of the 
European Union’s new Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
(the’ EU Copyright Directive’) purports to redress a ‘value gap’, whereby 
online content sharing platforms profit from copyright infringement without 
sufficient remuneration to copyright owners.38 I suggest that, while it does 
focus on a structural power asymmetry, it risks compounding the 
communicative power of: 
• dominant online platforms relative to copyright owners; 
 
 37.  See below, part 1.2. 
 38.  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market. The term ‘value gap’ was used in the initial 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market—COM (2016) 593.  
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• dominant copyright businesses relative to users; and 
• incumbent copyright businesses relative to newcomers, 
independent authors, and small-scale copyright businesses. 
There are no easy answers when it comes to pursuing a copyright policy that 
promotes democracy and self-authorship to the fullest. There will always be 
trade-offs. What is clear, though, is that there is more to think about than the 
traditional concern of balancing incentives to create against the need for 
access to works: especially when we understand that free access to and 
sharing of works, and not only strong copyrights, may contribute to troubling 
incentives and hierarchies of wealth and communicative power. 
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1. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN ONLINE FREE CONTENT ECONOMIES 
1.1 Formal freedom is not enough 
There has been a tendency to overstate the potential of a reduction in 
the strength of copyright, especially online, to generate a ‘robust’ public 
sphere, and to right the perceived wrongs of copyright-based, mass-mediated 
culture. But a recent run of bad news about online platforms—disinformation 
and misinformation, filter bubbles, echo chambers, invasion of privacy and 
behavior modification for rent, election hacking—calls into question the 
contention that online free content economies are better for democracy and 
individual self-authorship simply by virtue of being freer of the constrains of 
copyright. 
Benkler, though very optimistic about the potential of networked 
information economies, was, open to the possibility that changes in the 
conditions and parameters characterizing our networked environment might 
require a change in assessment of the merits of that environment.  With 
considerable foresight, he even contemplated the possibility of certain 
internet services like Google becoming so powerful as to raise the prospect 
of a new kind of mass media model. He was, however, fairly confident that 
the pattern of information flow in digital networks is more resistant to the 
application of centralized control or influence than was the traditional, 
copyright-based mass media model.39 Unfortunately, his caveat about the 
contingency of his assessment of the networked environment has proven all 
too prophetic.40 
How could this be? How could a system with so few formal constraints 
on free expression and sharing of content fall short in meeting free speech 
goals such as diversity and inclusiveness? Andrew Keen, a longtime critic of 
cyber-utopianism, puts it this way: ‘distributed technology doesn’t 
necessarily lead to distributed economics and the cooperative nature of its 
technology isn’t reflected in its impact on the economy.’41 Freedom from the 
constraints of copyright is not a sufficient condition for a culture that 
enhances individual flourishing or effective, robust, respectful deliberation. 
 
 39.  BENKLER, supra note 2 at 261. 
 40.  See Benkler’s comments in Wil S. Hylton, Down the Breitbart Hole, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/magazine/breitbart-alt-right-steve-bannon.html 
). 
 41.  ANDREW KEEN, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER (Main edition ed. 2015), 33. 
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Individuals’ and society’s capacity to translate formal freedom into real 
self-authorship and democracy depends on contextual factors.42 Freedom is 
relative. The substantive distribution of power and privilege, especially the 
power to communicate and exert cultural influence, may constrain or 
enhance autonomy just as much as formal prohibitions on certain kinds of 
speech.43 
If copyright is not dictating the dynamics according to which power, 
resources and cultural influence are distributed, it is likely that some other 
structural constraints are. In this part of the article, I will explore those 
structural conditions and some of their consequences for democracy, self-
authorship, diversity and inclusiveness. 
Professors Jonathan Barnett and Guy Pesach have each made important 
contributions to the critique of online free content economies, and their 
effects on political economy of creative culture. Barnett argued that a zero 
priced content environment online produces winner-take-all outcomes. Rent 
extraction opportunities, he contends, are shifted from content production 
markets to curatorial platforms (such as search engines). Eroding copyright 
protection for online content may result in pricing and output distortions in 
markets for curatorial services (concentration problems) and,  in the longer 
term,  content markets.44 The availability of free content is therefore not 
‘free’ from a social point of view. 
Pesach argued that the decentralization of cultural production and 
distribution online, despite numerous benefits, has not proved an entirely 
democratic development. He describes certain quarters of the online 
information sphere as operating “beyond IP’, but suggests that these realms 
suffer problems similar to those which afflict copyright-mediated content 
industries. The means of deriving wealth and power from content (through 
harvesting and analyzing data) is highly concentrated, and there is a problem 
of content diversity.45 He attributes these problems in part to weakening of 
copyright protection online. 
 
 42.  BENKLER, supra note 2 at 141.  Benkler is at his most impressive when dealing with the 
relationship between freedom, constraint and autonomy. He writes, “If we accept that all individuals are 
always constrained by personal circumstances both physical and social, then the way to think about 
autonomy of human agents is to inquire into the relative capacity of individuals to be the authors of 
their lives within the constraints of context. From this perspective, whether the sources of constraint are 
private actors or public law is irrelevant. What matters is the extent to which a particular configuration 
of material, social, and institutional conditions allows an individual to be the author of his or her life, 
and to what extent these conditions allow others to act upon the individual as an object of 
manipulation.⁠” 
 43.  See e.g. Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 674 
(2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=744533. 
 44.  BARNETT, supra note 20 at 20. 
 45.  Pessach, Beyond IP, supra note 23 at 2030, 2044. 
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Benkler has also revised his views on the ‘wealth of networks’. He now 
considers that the ‘commons’ of the internet have not, in many cases, 
produced more attractive forms of social relations.46 He identifies a number 
of 'points of control' over online information sphere that have developed, 
which run against the hope that the internet would reduce opportunities for 
manipulation by one actor over another. Among these, he includes the 
development of ‘big data’ big data and its use in behavioral control; and the 
building in of digital rights management into internet standards. He says,  
“Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and 
effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some 
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple 
finding ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the 
open layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and 
using the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low 
cost input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” 
as Julie Cohen puts it.”47 
He still emphasizes the need to maintain decentralized, networked peer 
systems in order to resist centralization and the ordering of state or market. 
Indeed, he attributes responsibility for the woes of the internet in great part 
to the resilience of markets and states and their ability to ‘domesticate’ 
decentralized, networked, user creativity.48 
For the most part I agree with Benkler, but I think much more needs to 
be said about the role of free content in that ‘domestication’ process. Some 
commodification of creativity, in one form or other, seems to me inevitable 
because the public derives value from creative content; and enterprising 
businesses will naturally seek to leverage that value into profit, especially if 
they can obtain the source of value for free. What is crucial is, as Benkler 
says, is continually to assess how structures of power and incentive emerge 
in that process, and how these structures affect the public interest. 
In this part of the article, I will therefore add substantially to Barnett 
and Pesach’s critiques, focusing in particular on the downsides for diversity 
and inclusiveness associated with economies of ‘free stuff’ on online 
platforms such as search engines and social media. I begin by considering 
concentrations of attention, wealth and power online. Then I turn to 
 
46 Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia?, 18 DUKE L. AND TECH. REV. 78–84 
(2019), at 82. 
47 Benkler, supra note 4646 at 81-82.   
48 Id. at 83. 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
18 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. Vol 19:1 
problematic incentive structures and the ways in which they vitiate diversity 
and inclusiveness in individuals’ experience of the information environment. 
1.2 Attention is highly concentrated on the internet 
Digital technology has dramatically increased individuals’ 
opportunities to create and share works. On the internet, active participation 
in culture is more achievable than ever before.49 Professor Rebecca Tushnet, 
for example, is very enthusiastic about the democratizing influence of fan 
fiction on pop culture.50 Fans of films, novels and TV produce countless 
derivative stories, exploring the fictional universes and characters that 
fascinate them, and inscribing them with their own meanings. That is a good 
in itself, and it clearly increases diversity and inclusiveness along one 
dimension. 
That benefit does not, however, necessarily translate into an increase in 
the inclusiveness or diversity of the body of works that reaches most 
individuals. Nor does the high rate of participation necessarily mean that the 
power to exert a meaningful influence on culture and discourse is distributed 
broadly or inclusively. Almost anyone can publish an opinion or other kind 
of work without much difficulty, but these contributions will not carry much 
influence if the public sees only a tiny fraction of them.51 
The very absence of the traditional gatekeepers, the very size of the 
internet, the very multitude of works disseminated digitally, necessitates new 
tools for finding and selecting works. It is necessary to use various forms of 
filtration to reduce the number of works to which an individual is exposed to 
a manageable level. 
Copyright minimalists were optimistic about the potential of digital 
search and filtration tools to create a more dis-intermediated, decentralized, 
democratized marketplace of ideas. Rather than commercial copyright-based 
businesses (publishers, film and tv studios, record labels and so on) deciding 
what is published and brought to the attention of the public, search engines 
and social networks use algorithms to track user preferences and behavior, 
and deliver results based on the so-called ‘wisdom of the crowd’. Search 
engines like Google’s, for example, use an algorithm to rank web pages in 
their search results based on, among other things, the number of incoming 
 
 49.  Lessig, supra note 2 at 47. 
 50.  Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. 
LA ENT. L.J. 651 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 28. 
 51.  Matthew Hindman, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2008), 56 
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links to that page.52 The algorithm is recursive, so that links from pages that 
have, themselves, a higher number of links, weigh more heavily in deciding 
the ranking of the linked page in search results.53 
As a consequence, the public would no longer need to rely on either the 
price system or a managerial structure for coordination in selecting works 
worthy of their attention.54 This would supposedly democratize the selection 
of works, and the decisions about which works to give attention to. The 
combination of an increase in opportunities for individuals to create and 
publish content, and a decrease in the opportunities for commercial actors to 
intervene in the selection and dissemination of works would seem to be a 
boon for inclusiveness. 
Unfortunately, the dramatic increase in the number of content creators 
coincides with a dramatic increase in the concentration of ownership of 
platforms for disseminating content, and a dynamic of exponential 
concentration of internet users’ attention.55 Both the distribution of user 
traffic (page views by users) and links follows a power law distribution.56 
The probability of having a large number of links is inversely and 
exponentially proportional to the number of links. In practical terms, on the 
internet, the power law distribution means a very small number of sites end 
up with an extremely high number of links and visits, and a very large 
number of sites end up with an extremely small number of links and visits.57 
The curve describing such distributions is said to have a ‘long tail’.58 
The promise of the ‘long tail’ was that it would have something for 
everyone—this was the thesis of an influential cyber-utopian book by Chris 
Anderson.59 Trends in the distribution of attention on the internet do not, 
however, seem to have borne out the initial optimism about the long tail. 
Even Anderson seems to have reconsidered the matter somewhat. In an 
article co-written with Wolff, published some time after his influential book, 
he cites statistics from Compete, showing that the top 10 Web sites 
 
 52.  I will discuss below some other very material features of such algorithms, but for now let us 
stick with this simplified description. 
 53.  Steven Levy, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 22 
(2011). 
 54.  BENKLER, supra note 2 at 63, 74; Elkin-Koren, supra note 2 at 384. 
 55.  See e.g. ELI M. NOAM, WHO OWNS THE WORLD’S MEDIA?: MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND 
OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD (2016), 8. 
 56.  This pattern was recognized fairly early, for example in the work of Bernardo A. Huberman et 
al., Strong Regularities in World Wide Web Wurfing, 280 SCIENCE 95–97 (1998). 
 57.   Hindman, supra note 51 at 42; BENKLER, supra note 2 at 243. 
 58.  Chris Anderson, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 
(2006). 
 59.  Id. See also BENKLER, supra note 2 at 242. 
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accounted for 31% of US page views in 2001, 40% in 2006, and about 75% 
in 2010.60  In July 2017, according to one study, five websites—Google, 
Facebook, YouTube, Yahoo, and Amazon—owned 32.34% of website 
traffic.61 
Benkler, drawing on studies by Pennock, Dresner and Farrell, and 
others, argued that attention and link distribution did not always follow an 
exponential curve. There were, he said, ‘clusters of moderately read sites’ 
providing ‘platforms for vastly greater numbers of speakers than were heard 
in the mass media environment’.62 Particularly salient to civil society—this 
was the distribution to be found among political blogs.63 
Professor Matthew Hindman’s more recent work contradicts this 
conclusion.64 Having conducted his own study of the distribution of attention 
online, and reviewed the literature on the subject, Hindman reported in 2008 
that the top ten political websites, in relation to any given political issue, 
amount for more than half the total links.65 As for news, he found that 
audience share among online media sites is not more equal than in print 
media. The top twenty online news outlets, he found, had more of the online 
market than they did in print media. Particularly telling was the drop in 
audience share for media organizations in what he categorized as the ‘middle 
class’—outlets ranked 21-500 in terms of their readership:66 
“Outlets ranked from 101 to 500 account for 35 percent of print 
newspaper readership, but only 22 percent of readership for media 
sites. And while papers below the top 500 represent only 9 percent of 
the nation’s print circulation, 21 percent of media site visits go to 
outlets ranked 500 or below.”67 
Overall concentration, he found, was similar on the net and in traditional 
media. The difference was that online attention was more fragmented than it 
was among traditional media.68 
Recent studies of the UK news media markets show similar trends. 
While the number of national newspapers did not drop between 2007 and 
2018, the number of local and regional newspapers has decreased by 25% in 
 
 60. Anderson and Wolff, supra note 8. 
 61.  Alexandra Tachalova, This Is What They Search For: The Most Popular US Industries 
&amp; Traffic Shares, MOZ, https://moz.com/blog/most-popular-us-industries-traffic-shares (last 
visited Apr 16, 2019). 
 62.  BENKLER, supra note 2 at 242 
 63.  Id at 251. 
 64.  Note also that Benkler’s recent comments in Hylton, supra note 40, suggest that he may also 
revise his views on this matter. 
 65.  Hindman, supra note 51 at 49. 
 66.  Id. at 94. 
 67.  Id. at 92-93. 
 68.  Id. 
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the same period from 1,303 in 2007 to 982 in 2018.69 The increase in supply 
side concentration coincides with a dramatic increase in the proportion of 
UK adults for whom the internet is the main source of news from 4% in 2007 
to 37% in 2018; and in the percentage of adults who read news on internet 
from 20% to 64% in the same period.70 Correlation is not causation and there 
are multiple causes for the increase in concentration, but it is tolerably clear 
that both the free sharing of news stories online, and power law distributions 
of attention online, play a role.71 
Fragmentation of attention into the long tail, as much as concentration 
in the ‘short head’, seems to exacerbate inclusiveness problems. Professor 
Anita Elberse’s book on blockbusters suggests that attention in the long tail 
is ever more diffuse, while blockbusters receive an ever more concentrated 
proportion of the public’s attention.72 For example, of 8 million digital music 
tracks sold in 2011, approximately 94% sold fewer than 100 copies, while 
32% sold only one copy. Compare this to 2009, when 6.4 million tracks were 
sold, of which 93% sold fewer than 100 copies, and 27% sold only one copy; 
and again to 2007, where 3.9 million digital tracks were sold, with 91% 
selling fewer than 100 copies, and 24% selling only one copy.73 Google’s 
CEO, Eric Schmidt, described the trend in this way: 
“I would like to tell you that the internet has created such a level 
playing field that the long tail is absolutely the place to be, that there’s 
so much differentiation . . . Unfortunately, that is not the case . . . In 
fact, it is probable that the internet will lead to larger blockbusters 
and more concentration of brands.”74 
The short head is getting shorter and fatter and the long tail, longer and 
thinner. 
It follows logically that the redistribution and fragmentation of attention 
into the long tail comes at the expense of ‘middle class’, moderately sized 
media producers.75 The problem is not only that winners take all. It is that 
both the ‘losers’ (for want of a better word for members of the fragmented 
long tail) and ‘winners’ draw attention away from the class of professional 
 
 69. OVERVIEW OF RECENT DYNAMICS IN THE UK PRESS MARKET - A REPORT FOR DCMS (2018), 
https://secure.toolkitfiles.co.uk/clients/19826/sitedata/Reports/Press-report-for-DCMS.pdf./, 4. 
 70.  Id. at 6. 
 71.  CAIRNCROSS, supra note 7 at 17, 37. 
 72.  ANITA ELBERSE, BLOCKBUSTERS: HIT-MAKING, RISK-TAKING, AND THE BIG BUSINESS OF 
ENTERTAINMENT (2013). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Eric Schmidt, quoted in James Manyika, Google’s View on the Future of Business: An 
Interview with CEO Eric Schmidt, 1 MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 136–38 (2008). 
 75.  Matthew Hindman, What is the Online Public Sphere Good For? THE HYPERLINKED 
SOCIETY: QUESTIONING CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE, MICHIGAN: DIGITAL CULTURE BOOKS 
268–88 (2008). 
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and competent, if not extravagantly successful, authors and publishers of 
works; and indeed the whole commercial infrastructure in which they are 
situated. This shrinking ‘middle class’ would include precisely the kind of 
independent denizens of the creative world on whom we might rely to sustain 
the diversity and inclusiveness of the public sphere. 
1.3 The dynamics of filtration concentrate attention 
The concentration of attention on the internet that I have been 
describing is closely connected to the dynamics of ‘dis-intermediated’ online 
filtration and selection. Three important features of these dynamics require 
special attention. 
Firstly, the internet does not seem to have displaced the role of 
commercial media organizations in selecting and filtering content. As 
Netanel predicted in 2001, consumers still need assistance in evaluating the 
quality and credibility of information and its providers. They therefore rely 
on filtration and accreditation tools similar to those operating in the mass 
media.76 Consequently, media sources that were dominant before the internet 
also tend to dominate on the internet.77 
Secondly, the dynamics of filtration themselves tend to compound 
existing concentrations of attention. Recursive filtration algorithms 
operating on search engines and social networks quickly generate a hierarchy 
of visibility on the internet. Heavily linked sites will appear higher in search 
results on search engines, will therefore attract more views and links, and 
(assuming a route to monetizing views such as advertising) will gain access 
to more resources.78 The reason for this is that search rankings have 
considerable influence over the way in which internet users direct their 
attention. Search engine users rarely look beyond the first few results yielded 
by any given search, let alone the first page of results.79 One review of 
literature on click-through rates on search engine results found that, on 
average, 29.6% of searchers select the first result displayed, 13.1%, the 
second result, 9.2%, the third, with a decreasing percentage down to the tenth 
 
 76.  Netanel, Cyberspace Self Governance, supra note 3 at 477. 
 77.  Hindman, supra note 51 at 62. 
 78.  Id. at 55, 72, 93. 
 79.  Numerous studies arrive at materially the same conclusion, using different methods. See e.g. 
Nadine Höchstötter & Dirk Lewandowski, What Users See–Structures in Search Engine Results Pages, 
179 INFORMATION SCIENCES 1796–1812 (2009); Gord Hotchkiss, Marina Garrison & Steve Jensen, 
Search Engine Usage in North America, WHITE PAPER, ENQUIRO, KELOWNA, BC, CANADA (2005); 
Mark T. Keane, Maeve O’Brien & Barry Smyth, Are People Biased in Their Use of Search Engines?, 
51 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 49–52 (2008); THE VALUE OF GOOGLE RESULT POSITIONING, 2015 
(2013), https://justmythinking.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ChitikaInsights-
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result.80 In sum, sites that win attention will tend to increase the attention 
they gain, and sites which attract little attention will be ever less likely to 
attract more. 
Thirdly, the means of filtration itself is highly concentrated. The trope 
of the liberated individual ‘surfing’ the web on her own terms is outdated. 
Most internet activity is mediated through key application which aggregate 
and distribute works in one way or another: most notably search engines and 
social networks.81 The ownership of these internet platforms is highly 
concentrated and vertically integrated.82 Likewise, supply in various key 
platform media niches (video on demand, audio streaming, news, etc.) is 
highly concentrated. Economies of scale, power law distributions of 
attention, and above all, network effects promote winner-takes-all outcomes 
among internet platforms.83 
Whatever its causes, the communicative and cultural power of 
dominant internet platforms is evident from figures on viewership, market 
share and reach, and advertising investment share on the internet. For the 
past ten years, Google’s share of the search engine market has hovered 
around 90%.84 As at January 2017, one statistics analysis site had Facebook 
at 87% share of the UK social network market.85 According to a different 
study, Facebook’s share of global social media market (as of April 2019), is 
slightly lower, at 61.55%.86 
Market reach figures are no less stunning. In 2016, Facebook was used 
by almost 78% of U.S. smartphone users.87 In the same year, 63% of US 
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https://www.statista.com/statistics/280301/market-share-held-by-facebook-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/ 
(last visited Mar 18, 2017). 
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smartphone users logged into Facebook an average of 8 times per day.88 
According to one study, this year Facebook had a market reach of 81%, and 
Google had a market reach of 71%, in the global mobile apps market of 
around 3 billion users, with Facebook the most downloaded mobile app in 
2019.89  30% of internet users’ time spent online, globally, was spent on 
social media.90 And according to Statista,  as at May 2019, Facebook had 
2.32 billion users worldwide.91 
A survey of the market reach of online video platforms from November 
2018 found that 90 percent of internet users in the United States accessed 
YouTube (owned by Alphabet, which also owns Google) to watch online 
video. Facebook was ranked second with a 60 percent market reach.92 In the 
United States, 85 percent of online users watched video online on a weekly 
basis.93  As at 10 July 2019, one statistics service estimated YouTube’s share 
of the online video portal market at 74.75%.94 
What about web traffic? A study from 2015 by internet analysis 
website, Parse.ly, found that, between them, Facebook and Google 
accounted for 81% of traffic to the Parse.ly network of media sites, with 43% 
going through Facebook and 38% through Google.95 In January 2017, 
Facebook provided nearly 40% of online publishers’ traffic, but it ended the 
year at 26% after it changed its news feed algorithm to deprioritize news.96 
In the same year, Google started at 34% and ended at 44%.97It is also telling 
that Facebook and Google (taken together) accounted for 75% of new 
spending on online advertising in 2015. In the US, 85 cents of every dollar 
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spent on digital marketing went to the two companies in the first quarter of 
2016.98 The willingness of advertisers to commit the overwhelming majority 
of their online budget to these two platforms is a striking indication of the 
extent to which Google and Facebook command internet users’ attention. 
Facebook and Alphabet’s (Google’s) incredible reach and dominance 
of the platform market, coupled with the dynamics of search and filtration 
described above, places an enormous wealth of communicative and cultural 
power into their hands. Facebook works on a business model where 
developers build applications within the Facebook platform, ultimately 
controlled by Facebook.99 Google manages both traffic and advertising and 
has cemented its monopoly over internet search.100 It uses this dominance to 
push other products and services within its portfolio.101 It is hard to imagine 
a scenario further from the cyber-utopian vision of decentralized digital 
democracy, characterized by self-actualized yeoman-publishers combining 
their communicative powers over open networks. 
1.4 ‘Free’ distribution of works contributes to concentration problems 
in online content economies 
We have considered the distribution of communicative power as 
between dominant and less dominant websites and online platforms. What 
about the distribution of power as between dominant internet platforms, 
copyright owners, and users of works? In the networked environment both 
copyright owners and users tend to cede communicative power and resources 
to dominant internet platforms: especially search engines and social 
networks. To be sure, when an internet user gains a right or capacity to access 
or use content without the need to pay or ask copyright owners for 
permission, the individual generally gains in communicative power. 
Likewise, when ordinary individuals find themselves able to publish works 
easily and inexpensively, their capacity to participate in culture and 
discourse increases. But the very exercise of that capacity by individuals 
contributes to other asymmetries of communicative and cultural power. 
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As Lanier points out, the removal of barriers to copying leads to a 
proliferation of businesses online that profit from selling services about 
information, rather than producing and selling information itself. Third 
parties pay to manipulate the online options that appear in front of people 
from moment to moment.102 On the internet, ‘If you’re not paying for 
something, you’re not the customer; you’re the product being sold’.103 
Providing free (frictionless) access to works and engaging user attention 
allows internet platforms to profit from the user-as-product in two main 
ways. 
Firstly, user attention is itself a valuable commodity. Platforms and 
websites can sell advertising on the basis of page ‘views’ or ‘eyeballs’. 
Works, on the internet, are used as vehicles for attracting user attention.104 
Internet intermediaries trade in that attention, and information about it. So, 
when an individual takes advantage of her power to access works freely 
while using an application on which those works are available, the 
intermediary that runs the application parlay this into profit. Any single view 
(access to a page or work by a user) is in this sense valuable for its own sake. 
Secondly, a user’s engagement with a work, whether by clicking 
through to a link to see the work, a ‘share’, a ‘like’, or some other use is 
valuable as a ‘signal’. For search engines and social network application 
providers, “Every action a user performs is considered a signal to be 
analyzed and fed back into the system.”105 By aggregating signals and using 
big data analysis tools, internet platforms can make predictions about users, 
which can then be used to target further content and advertising. This 
capacity to target content helps dominant internet platforms to keep user 
attention fixed in the network, which makes advertising space on the internet 
platform more valuable and gives it an advantage relative to competitors who 
do not have access to the same signals about users. In other words, free 
content helps to compound network effects. 
By providing free access to works, the internet platform maximizes its 
user base, and its capacity to sell advertisements and valuable data.106 Barnett 
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describes Google’s business model as follows. Google distributes 
‘informational assets’—content—to individual users at zero price. These 
information assets include search results and links on the search engine, news 
aggregations and snippets on Google news, user generated videos on 
YouTube, searchable snippets of books on Googlebooks, and so on. In 
distributing this content, it obtains data about individuals, which it sells to 
advertisers. It maximizes revenues by driving down its input costs (the cost 
of analyzing web pages and providing links to them). This in turn maximizes 
the Google user base, which enhances the power and value of Google’s data 
set and data analysis. Internet platforms like Google have an interest in being 
able to copy works in the course of analyzing and ranking them, and in being 
permitted to provide links to works, without paying the copyright owners of 
those works. This is largely what allows them to run a profitable data-
analysis and ad-selling business.107 
Not only is the provision of free access to works lucrative for dominant 
internet intermediaries; it also gives them a stunning amount of 
communicative and cultural power. That power is, in some ways, power over 
users. It is power that allows internet intermediaries and their customers 
(such as advertisers) to manipulate and target internet users in ways that the 
users are not aware of (although recent media attention is increasing public 
awareness).108 It is hard to fully comprehend the extent of the power of data 
aggregation, but a few examples help to give a sense of it. 
Signal analysis by internet intermediaries produces incredibly detailed 
information about individual users. For example, using only Facebook 
‘likes’, researchers in one study were able fairly reliably to ‘model’ the latent 
traits of 58,000 volunteers, including traits such as sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, 
happiness, and substance addiction, among others.109 Another study 
indicated that Facebook was able both to predict user emotions based on data 
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analysis, and manipulate emotions through the newsfeed.110 Worse, most 
users, even fairly sophisticated ones, have not generally been aware of the 
extent to which data is collected about them, and used to tailor information 
and advertisements that are presented to them, or to influence their 
behavior.111The cumulative gains in internet intermediary power offset, to a 
considerable degree, users’ gains in communicative empowerment. 
In short, the relationship between freer access to works online and self-
authorship is not straightforward. 
1.5 Concentration and blandness (again) 
One might take the optimistic view that concentration of attention and 
power on online platforms is no cause for concern. One reason to take such 
a view is that, in spite of the dominance of players like Google and Facebook, 
alternatives exist. Users are free to seek out works elsewhere. Copyright 
owners are free not to publish their content for free on those dominant 
platforms, and to use other channels for dissemination. 
Another reason is that dissemination of works through internet 
platforms is not, as Benkler points out, subject to selection and filtration of 
works at a single point of control. Network filtration is supposed to dis-
intermediate the curation and selection of works. It is supposed to give effect 
to the preferences of individuals, and helpfully order information by 
aggregating such preferences. This would seem to be the epitome of 
inclusiveness, self-authorship and democracy: where the collective actions 
of unconstrained, autonomous individuals, rather than the self-interested 
curatorial decisions of commercially minded platforms, determine what 
works are visible to any given member of the public. 
1.5.1 Network effects 
There are good reasons to take a more pessimistic view, however. While 
both copyright owners and users are, in form, free to seek or publish works 
outside applications, in practice, network effects mitigate against this. 
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Knowing that around half Americans get their news through Facebook, and 
a quarter of UK adults from Google, a publisher of news content would be 
ill advised to eschew the platforms.112 Indeed, Facebook’s recent 
reprioritization of news content in user feeds is a serious blow to news 
providers who had spent time and money optimizing content for Facebook, 
and come to rely on Facebook referrals and advertising eyeballs as a key 
source of revenue.113 By the same token, knowing she is likely to access a 
great deal of news content for free on Facebook, and having also come to 
rely heavily on Facebook to keep in touch with friends, even to the point of 
losing their other contact details, a user has little prima facie incentive to go 
elsewhere.114 
Moreover, the logic of filtration on search engines and social networks 
is opaque. It is mostly concealed from the public. Individuals have little 
knowledge or control of the criteria by which applications like Facebook or 
Google filter, rank and present information to them.115 The example of the 
news publishers in the paragraph above has further import. Content 
businesses that increasingly rely on these applications to disseminate their 
content are also subject to the whims of these organizations. Business models 
built on optimizing content for search engines, news feeds and online 
advertising may be swept away from one day to the next. 
1.5.2 Personalization and ‘the filter bubble’ 
The most problematic pressure, however, has to do with the ways in 
which search engine and social network algorithms are calibrated to produce 
‘relevant’ content for their users. The relevance of any given ranking in a 
news feed or search results page is not determined only objectively—by 
reference to aggregated preferences of the public as a whole. It is also 
determined by an approximation of the subjective preference of the user. 
Users’ past viewing and search behavior is, as mentioned above, analyzed as 
a signal. Applications like search engines and social networking sites 
aggregate data about users with similar signal patterns and attempt to predict 
preferences based on that analysis. 
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In 2009 Google changed its search algorithm so that it now tailors 
search results based on signals and data gathered about the individual 
conducting the search. For example, a search for ‘proof of climate change’ 
might turn up different results for an environmental activist and an oil 
company executive.116 The oil executive might see results tending to play 
down climate change; the activist, results tending to assert its importance, 
and prove its existence. Different individuals, in other words, are presented 
with different information purporting to be factual and organically, neutrally 
derived from the ‘wisdom of crowds’. 
Facebook’s algorithm for ranking content in user news feeds, Edgerank, 
also uses personalization.117 There are some differences between the way in 
which personalization is tailored on Facebook, Google and other 
intermediary platforms. The biggest platforms are, however, broadly similar 
in one important way. Results are tailored for ‘relevance’ to individual users, 
based on past signals such as views, ‘likes’, searches, buys, and language 
used on the platform and related applications.118 
It is not clear to me that this kind of personalization is empowering to 
individuals. On the contrary, it seems to give internet platforms considerable 
power over individuals (a reduction in self-authorship). The author and 
businessman Eli Pariser popularized the term ‘filter bubble’ to describe the 
characteristic of the internet whereby search engines and social networks 
algorithmically tailor content to maximize each individual user’s attention.119 
The filter bubble is a space in which individuals are cordoned off from 
whatever information is deemed irrelevant to them by the algorithm that is 
personalizing their information stream. Pariser writes, 
“When you enter a filter bubble, you’re letting the companies that 
construct it choose what options you’re aware of. You may think 
you’re the captain of your own destiny, but personalization can lead 
you down a road to a kind of informational determinism in which 
what you’ve clicked in the past determines what you see next.”120 
More troubling still is the fact that individuals have, at least until recently, 
tended not even to be aware of the extent to which the information presented 
to them is personalized.121 This outcome is even less inclusive than the mass 
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media model, and liable to reduce the diversity of the range of works to 
which individuals are exposed. 
Individuals’ general lack of agency in the filtration process is not the 
only troubling feature of the ‘filter bubble’. As I explained in the preceding 
part of this chapter, works are powerful tools for engaging the attention of 
the public, and data about that attention is packaged and used to sell 
advertising.122 Indeed, the key objective of internet applications such as 
Google and Facebook is to maximize user time on their apps. The lion’s 
share of their other business objectives—collecting, analyzing and selling 
valuable data, selling advertising, and so on—are dependent on keeping the 
attention of as many users as possible, for as long as possible, on their 
application.123 Lanier describes the dominant internet applications as 
“empires of behavior modification for rent”.124 Their user interfaces and 
content presentation and prioritization strategies are consciously and 
carefully designed to cultivate compulsive engagement by users, even 
addiction.125 
Works and content displayed to users therefore become both vehicles 
for advertising, and for harvesting the attention and data used in targeting 
that advertising. This has significant repercussions for the parameters under 
which works are produced, funded, and displayed (ranked) in users’ 
networked information streams. The kind of attention that is of interest to 
internet platforms and their customers (advertisers and sometimes political 
organizations) is not necessarily the kind of attention which promotes users’ 
self-authorship, or productive participation in democratic deliberation. Nor 
does internet platforms’ quest for attention through curation of filter bubbles 
seem optimal for cultivating diversity and inclusiveness. 
In analyzing data about video views, Facebook counts the ‘view’ at the 
three second mark (whether or not the viewer has even turned on the 
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sound).126 This bespeaks an intention to divert attention momentarily, either 
to register a ‘view’ that triggers payment by advertisers, or in fact to display 
an ad, rather than presenting something of enduring interest to a user. The 
signals that likely interest the profit-minded internet platform are signals 
about what will attract a click or a view from a user, not signals about the 
quality of the users’ experience once the click has been made. Internet 
platforms make money distracting and maintaining user attention long 
enough to elicit a datum about consumption preferences, or to present an 
advertisement, and then distracting attention again with some new stimulus. 
Pariser points out that our responses to content presented in news feeds 
and other similar ranked presentations of works and information tend to be 
driven by impulse. We are, he points out, naturally predisposed to be 
attracted by certain stimuli. We are likely to read content about sex, power, 
gossip, violence, celebrity, or humor, first. This is the content that makes it 
most easily into the filter bubble.127 Works which most readily featured in 
social networking news feeds are those  which stimulate outrage.128 The 
metric of what we read first, or click on most often, though, provides 
suppliers with a fairly skewed picture of our tastes.129 Such content would 
seem as suitable a candidate for the Baywatch critique about the proliferation 
of lowest common denominator fare, as anything presented by mass media. 
1.5.3 Group polarization 
Another problem with the filter bubble is that it contributes to 
polarization in discourse and culture. Professor Cass Sunstein has explained 
that, where members of a group begin with broadly similar views, interaction 
within the group tends to galvanize members toward more extreme iterations 
of the view they initially took.130 For example, a group of people who are 
opposed to the minimum wage are likely, after talking to each other (and not 
to others with whom they disagree) to be still more opposed. People who 
believe global warming is a serious problem are likely, after to discussion 
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with like-minded interlocutors, to insist on ever more severe measures to 
prevent global warming. People who take the opposite view, if they only talk 
to like-minded ‘climate change sceptics’, are likely to become more 
stridently opposed to measures taken to mitigate climate change.131 Sunstein 
charts out various psychological and sociological reasons for this shift 
toward extremes, but those details are beyond the scope of this article.132 
Here is an example of group polarization in action, even in that most 
promising system for organizing creativity—networked peer production. 
Early in the second Iraq war, the Los Angeles Times attempted to 
crowdsource an editorial—a ‘wikitorial’ on the conflict. Arguments between 
those with opposing viewpoints quickly descended into ‘flamewars’. 
Ultimately the publication forked the debate into two separate sides, each 
side deliberating only with its own members.133 The result was, in effect, to 
polarize the two sides, excluding each from the perspective of the other—a 
total failure of inclusiveness and diversity. Polarization happened here 
merely because participants were allowed to split into separate deliberating 
groups, not because they were intentionally herded in any way. 
When deliberation and discussion is purposefully nudged into groups 
of like-minded people via relevance filtration, chances of polarization are 
very high. Filtration algorithms on social networks such as Facebook tailor 
users’ newsfeeds based on their past behavior, and the past behavior of their 
‘friends’, and tend to corral them into groups of like-minded people, who 
post and share content with which they tend already to agree.134 
Indeed, presenting users with increasingly extreme iterations of an 
argument or viewpoint that they have initially engaged (by viewing a video, 
say) has proven a highly effective strategy for maximizing user time on 
platforms. For example, YouTube has an ‘Up Next’ sidebar, and 
automatically starts the next video from this algorithmically generated 
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sidebar as soon as the last one finishes. The ‘Up Next’ algorithm is 
responsible for more than 70 percent of user time on app.135 Its purpose is to 
capture and keep user attention, and it turns out that taking users down a 
‘rabbit hole’ of increasingly extreme and polarized content is a good way to 
do this. Without any intentional malice on the part of YouTube, relevance 
maximization produces this very troubling outcome, and it would seem that 
preventing it requires deliberate, active curation on the part of the platform. 
In order for deliberative discourse to avoid the trap of polarization, 
deliberators need exposure to, and engagement with, others who do not share 
their views. De-centralized filtration and selection of works has not reliably 
provided this kind of exposure. 
1.6 When ‘grass roots’ goes wrong 
So much for algorithmic filtration. What about the differences in author 
motivation between copyright-based and online free content systems? A 
number of scholars make much of the fact that works produced through 
grass-roots engagement, without commercial motivation, tend to differ 
significantly (and for the better) from works produced under conventional 
commercial publishing arrangements.136 Benkler points out that, in the case 
of amateur contributions to culture, decisions about what to publish do not 
start from a manager or editor’s judgment about what would be relevant and 
interesting to many people without alienating too many others. It starts with 
the question, ‘What do I care about most now?’137 Tushnet makes a similar 
point, arguing that amateur creation and dissemination of works is driven by 
desire and passion, rather than commercial considerations.138 The parameters 
and constraints that apply to commercial publication—such as the need to 
attract the largest possible paying audience (and therefore to aim for ‘lowest 
common denominator’ fare)—are less prominent; while intrinsic 
motivations and true political and civic concern have free reign. 
With this difference in motivation, will tend to come different kinds of 
works. There is a gain in expressive variety that comes from an increase in 
the production and dissemination of non-commercially motivated creation 
of works (diversity). The inclusion of those impassioned ‘voices’ into culture 
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and discourse (inclusiveness) is also generally a good thing. But it is not 
always a good thing, nor is it good in every way for self-authorship and 
democracy. 
Let me give, here, a few examples of how online dynamics of desire—
dissemination and publication according to what users care about most—
may work against diversity and inclusiveness. These examples are rather 
dramatic, and of course, one might offer a number of examples of beneficial 
outcomes of desire-based amateur publication and dissemination online. For 
example, the ease of podcasting has led to an explosion of creativity and high 
quality audio content. Twitter has permitted new forms of political 
mobilization and information sharing, allowing coordinated challenges 
against powerful state actors.  Blogs have helped to supplement the watchdog 
role of the media, making important scandals known to the public.  Fan 
fiction has allowed ordinary individuals to challenge conventions of gender, 
sexuality and power by re-imagining works of pop culture. 
If we are arguing by example and anecdote, though, (and this seems 
very common in arguments celebrating networked information economies) 
we ought to make sure we are as cognizant of the gloomy and discouraging 
examples as of the inspiring ones. 
Ease of publication online is liable to amplify the voices of those who 
are most passionate, and most prolific in their output; but not necessarily the 
most truthful, or the most rigorous. In a 2016 article in The Atlantic about 
racist extremism on the internet, one interviewee pointed out, 
Racist propagandists have motivation to put that stuff [white 
supremacist propaganda] out . . . The anti-Semites can flood an area 
and there’s no contradictory evidence. There aren’t people out there 
trying to prove that Jews aren’t running the government.”139 
Online forums tend to amplify the voice of the vociferous extremist (or 
propagandist) and conceal the opinion of the quiet moderate. This is 
obviously bad for diversity and inclusiveness. 
The extent to which a person is motivated to create or disseminate or 
view a work absent commercial incentives (Benkler’s ‘what do I care most 
about now?’ factor) is not itself a measure of the work’s social or cultural 
value. One may be simultaneously passionate and ignorant, passionate and 
bigoted, passionate and manipulative. Or one might simply be motivated by 
mischievous or anarchic impulses—as, it seems, is the now infamous class 
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of amateur content creators, known as internet ‘trolls’.140 As the ‘Russian 
election hacking’ and ‘fake news’ scandals have revealed, trolls may be very 
organized, able to intentionally and successfully stoke division and spread 
misinformation and propaganda, with all of the power of data analytics and 
network effects at their disposal.141 Falsehood, conspiracy, misinformation 
and disinformation spread very quickly online, especially if their 
dissemination is carefully targeted.142 
In one sense, the explosion of radical voices online is democratizing, 
because it suggests that marginal voices are finding a new platform.143 But 
ultimately, if the aim is to foster productive democratic deliberation and 
individual self-authorship prioritizing marginal, extreme, and downright 
false content at the expense of more balanced, reasoned, tolerant, or simply 
more representative content, is unhelpful. In so far as individual users are led 
down partisan ‘rabbit holes’, the diversity of the content they experience is 
stifled. In so far as they are encouraged into passivity, and subject to 
powerful infrastructures designed to influence and modify their behavior, the 
consequent distribution of cultural and communicative power would seem to 
be far from inclusive. 
1.7 Propaganda and manipulation 
The concentration of attention on Google and Facebook, combined with 
the insights available from extensive analysis of users’ data, makes those 
platforms and their users particularly vulnerable to dissemination of 
falsehood.144  Governments or political groups seeking to suppress or 
influence information flows find themselves in a game of ‘one stop 
shopping’: by targeting users through a handful of dominant internet 
platforms they can exert great reach and influence.145 
A series of important investigative articles documents the role played 
by social media propaganda campaigns, targeting users through big data 
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analysis and the use of bots to artificially elevate content in news feeds, in 
both the recent US presidential election and the UK ‘Brexit’ referendum.146 
Renee DiResta has carefully documented the way in which Russian 
government operatives carefully spread disinformation and stoked division 
in US politics by targeting Facebook and Twitter campaigns.147 And Carole 
Cadwalladr has produced superb investigative articles on the role of an 
organization called Cambridge Analytica in both the ‘leave’ campaign, and 
Donald Trump’s campaign for presidency. Cambridge Analytica analyzed 
data from social media profiles and helped to target campaign messages 
based on the results of its analysis.148 
Recall, Facebook could manipulate its users’ emotions through the 
news feed. It is therefore hardly surprising that Amy Wigmore, Leave.EU’s 
communications director, said that Facebook likes were the campaign’s most 
‘potent weapon’, 
“Because using artificial intelligence, as we did, tells you all sorts of 
things about that individual and how to convince them with what sort 
of advert. And you knew there would also be other people in their 
network who liked what they liked, so you could spread. And then 
you follow them. The computer never stops learning and it never 
stops monitoring.”149 
The particular political entities involved here are less relevant than the means 
of spreading their influence. Wigmore is describing the subjugation of 
individual self-authorship, the invisible manipulation of individuals’ 
information sphere, by powerful political actors who know much more about 
the individuals than the individuals know about them. It is hard to imagine a 
scenario in which communicative power was more asymmetrically 
distributed. 
1.8 Direct intervention by platforms 
What about the claim that networked filtration is more democratic the 
basis that it does not have a single point of curatorial control? Things are not 
quite so simple. As the examples above suggest, the prospect of direct 
interference, at a single point of control, with users’ information streams is 
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no longer as unlikely as it may once have seemed. Conventional wisdom 
depicts filtration algorithms as passive vehicles, simply giving effect to 
users’ fully autonomous choices and preferences. As a matter of fact, 
however, the operations of algorithmic filtration are fairly opaque.150 This 
makes sense, since a successful ranking algorithm is a valuable trade secret. 
The perception, however, that filtration on social networks or search engines 
is truly ‘organic’ can be misleading and extremely disempowering to users. 
This is not only because information ranking algorithms are susceptible 
to manipulation, but also because platforms may exercise direct curatorial 
control of information flows. A scandal involving Facebook’s ‘trending’ 
news stories application illustrates the point well. Facebook’s trending news 
section was supposed merely to reflect organically whatever news stories 
users were sharing. In May 2016, however, it came to light that members of 
Facebook’s news team were manipulating and partly curating the ‘trending 
news’ module.151 Facebook’s curation involved injecting stories of its own 
news team’s choosing, rather than stories that were organically trending. It 
also involved suppressing, or demoting, stories which were deemed to have 
too strong a conservative bias.152 In some cases, allegedly, after a topic was 
injected ‘artificially’ into the news feed by Facebook staff, it picked up 
‘organically’ and became the number one trending news topic on 
Facebook.153 
Platforms may also intervene for less nefarious reasons. Various states 
are taking legislative measures to hold platforms accountable for harmful 
content posted by users.154Google, Facebook and Twitter have claimed they 
will do more to prevent the spread of disinformation, misinformation and 
other forms of harmful content online.155 In order to reduce polarization and 
outrage, Facebook has also recently announced that it has adjusted its 
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newsfeed algorithm in order to de-prioritize news items in user feeds.156 
Notably, though, Facebook has been fairly obstructive when it comes to 
audits of their advertising practices, and efforts to try to understand how 
targeted advertising and propaganda campaigns worked.157 
Taken at face value, these appear to be promising developments, but 
their structural effects are not straightforward. Newspapers aligned their 
business models around optimizing for Facebook’s algorithm (in so far as 
they could make educated guesses about what would be prioritized). The 
more prominent their content on online platforms, the more likely are readers 
to click through to their websites, and the more advertising revenue the 
papers are likely to derive.158 Having adopted a ‘free’ dissemination model, 
and having come to rely on platforms such as Facebook as key points of 
dissemination, newspapers are left high and dry when their news content is 
suddenly down-shifted in news feeds. The unilateral change, with little 
warning, and no consultation, has adversely affected their revenues.159 This 
is a dramatic example of the market power of dominant online platforms in 
the news market. 
More broadly, the kinds of curation I have just described seem very 
similar to the kind of centralized selection and control supposed to pervade 
traditional copyright-based media.  A select group of professionals, 
occupying a more or less unassailable point of control, exercise great power 
over the contents of culture and discourse. The difference is, traditional news 
media do not pretend merely to be presenting an organic report generated by 
users’ search and viewing behavior; and few, if any, traditional news media 
outlets consistently reach billions of viewers or readers. 
We seem faced with a choice between pure ‘dis-intermediated’ 
algorithmic filtering, with all of the troubling incentive structures that come 
with it; or more direct intervention and curation by platforms and ultimately 
the state. Both would seem to fall short of Benkler’s hope of removing ‘some 
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of the most basic opportunities for manipulation of those who depend on 
information and communication by the owners of the basic means of 
communications and the produces of the core cultural forms.’160 
1.9 A more judicious view of ‘free culture’ 
Digital utopians imagined the online free content sphere, unencumbered 
by restrictions on copying and communicating works, as a highly inclusive 
digital democracy, characterized by a level communicative playing field, and 
populated by individuals whose consumption of works, and contributions to 
culture are autonomous and self-actualizing. Benkler advocated the 
cultivation of a cultural production and exchange system that is ‘as 
unconstraining and free from manipulation as possible’ and saw great 
promise in the ‘wealth of networks’.161 The networked information economy 
and online marketplace of ideas are not currently living up to that promise. 
The Centre For Humane Technology puts it this way: 
“[S]eemingly separate problems – tech addiction, teen depression, 
shortening attention spans, political polarization, the breakdown of 
truth, outrage-ification of culture, and the rise of vanity/micro-
celebrity culture – are actually not separate issues. They are all 
symptoms of one underlying problem: the race between tech giants 
to capture human attention, which becomes a race to overwhelm 
human weaknesses. Put together, that race creates ‘human 
downgrading.’”162 
Human downgrading would seem to be the opposite of the democratizing 
and self-authorship-enhancing internet that copyright minimalists hoped for. 
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2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
2.1 Both strengthening and weakening copyright may have troubling 
structural consequences 
The implications of my analysis for the development of copyright law 
are many. 
• Changes in copyright law and practice effect the political 
economy of creative activity, which affects the quality and 
character of works, culture and discourse. 
• The political economy, both of traditional copyright media, and 
of online free content environments, seems to generate 
problematic incentives. 
• Communicative and cultural power is not widely enough 
distributed: both large internet platforms, and copyright 
industry businesses have accrued too much of it. 
• Free (or freer) access to content does not necessarily enhance 
individuals’ substantive, positive freedom and self-authorship. 
• The ‘democratization’ of content functions does not necessarily 
produce a more democratic landscape for information and 
creativity. 
I will focus here, though, on one key imperative that emerges from my 
analysis. 
Any efforts to develop copyright law must take into account existing 
structures of incentive, communicative power and opportunity, and the likely 
effects of the proposed intervention on those structures. The structural effects 
may not always follow the formal allocations of rights effectuated by the 
law. There may be unintended consequences, in terms of the allocation of 
wealth, power, influence and opportunity. 
To illustrate my point, I will first consider the structural impacts of 
expanding fair use. I will look at a number of different recommendations for 
the expansion of that exception, as well as an expansion of the 
‘transformative use’ doctrine which has in fact occurred. 
I do not wish, however, to create the impression that copyright-
maximizing doctrines are safe from the risk of producing structurally 
troubling outcomes. The structural impacts of developments in the law may 
be significant whether such developments or reforms are calculated to 
expand the strength and scope of copyright exceptions and increase users’ 
rights and privileges with respect to works; or whether they are directed at 
shoring up and strengthening exclusive rights in copyright. 
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This is a point that needs special emphasis, since the bulk of this article 
has been focused on refuting the copyright minimalist / internet optimist 
binary so common in the cultural turn. The purpose of this refutation, I want 
to reaffirm, is not to make an apology for maximalist copyright. Rather, it is 
to balance the scales by showing some of the downsides of online free 
content economies; and by showing that the structural and institutional 
parameters in which creative activity take place exert meaningful, qualitative 
effects, regardless of whether they are instituted by law, day to day practice, 
or existing patterns of wealth and power. 
After my analysis of fair use, I will therefore briefly consider the 
troubling structural implications of an intervention aimed at strengthening 
the rights of copyright owners. Article 17 of the European Union’s Directive 
on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (hereafter the ‘copyright 
directive’) strengthens the formal rights of copyright owners with respect to 
online platforms. Its practical effect, however, may be to give dominant 
online platforms even more curatorial power over individuals’ informational 
and cultural experience. 
2.2 Fair use 
Let us begin with expansions to the fair use exception to copyright. I 
will first review some of the proposed changes to fair use that emerged at the 
height of the cultural turn (in the first ten years of this century). Then I will 
consider the impacts of an actual change to the doctrine in recent years. 
Finally I will apply my insights about these actual changes to the proposals 
for further change. 
One of the recommendations common to many proponents of the 
cultural turn is to expand fairness exceptions: in the case of fair dealing 
jurisdictions, by introducing fair use; and in fair use jurisdictions, by 
expanding the classes of use deemed fair. Expansion of fair use is generally 
justified on the basis that it would enhance freedom of expression, freedom 
of imagination, and a fair distribution of cultural power. Unsurprisingly, 
recommendations for expanding fairness exceptions were at their height at 
the same time as the cultural turn was at its strongest: in the first ten years of 
this century. 
Recommendations to expand copyright exceptions seem to follow from 
the copyright minimalist / internet optimist framing that expects 
improvements in diversity and inclusiveness to follow from freer access to 
works online. Broadly, such an approach would prioritize individual and 
collective interests in a more robust public domain over copyright owners’ 
interests (and perhaps also over democratic civil society interests of the kind 
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articulated by Netanel).163 For example, the sense that inflexible copyright 
constrains expressive freedom played a part in the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s recommendation (approved by a more recent Productivity 
Commission report) to introduce a broad US style fair use in Australia, to 
replace a set of narrow fair dealing exceptions.164 
More radical proponents of the cultural turn recommended even more 
significant expansions. One recommendation is to invert of the onus of proof 
in relation to the fairness of uses of copyright material. Arewa argued that 
authors should have to prove uses to be unfair in order to demonstrate 
copyright infringement, instead of defendants being required to prove that 
the use falls under a fairness exception.165 Bohannan and Hovencamp argued 
that the copyright owner should need to prove harm to her ex ante incentive 
in order for a use of a work to be held to infringe copyright.166 Netanel 
offered a slightly less radical proposal. He contended that once a copyright 
defendant shows a ‘colorable claim of fair use’, the burden of proving that 
the use is unfair should pass to the copyright owner.167 Each variant of this 
approach would (to differing degrees) discourage copyright owners from 
suing for licensing fees in relation to markets which they either did not 
contemplate when creating their works or have not exploited themselves. 
Another similar approach, favored by scholars like Lange, and also 
Rubenfeld, adopted a different baseline: freedom of imagination. Lange and 
Rubenfeld, in separate articles, argued for the recognition of a positive user 
right of freedom of imagination.168 Creative appropriation, Lange argued, 
should be presumptively privileged in every instance: rising to the level of 
an affirmative user right. A fair use defense to copyright infringement would 
be withheld only in cases where there was no creative exercise of 
imagination in the second work at all.169 
Lange, optimistic about the democratizing power of the internet, had no 
hang-ups in moving the whole apparatus of identifying or weighing 
commercial harm to the margins of his analysis. Copyright cases concerned 
with the use of existing works ought to turn primarily on questions of 
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imaginative freedom. They should not, he argued, give primary concern to 
the negative effects on the economic value of an antecedent work, although 
in some cases, he concedes, ‘equitable provision for sharing the proceeds of 
such exploitations would follow’.170 
Proponents of these recommendations justify them on the basis that 
they would enhance freedom of expression, freedom of imagination, and a 
fair distribution of cultural power. Expanding fairness exceptions could 
serve to mitigate the causes of the concentration critique, by furnishing 
individuals and non-incumbents with greater cultural and communicative 
power relative to incumbent copyright industry players. These are, broadly 
speaking, inclusiveness goals, with follow on effects for diversity. 
2.2.1 Actual expansions to the fair use exception 
So much for proposed expansions of the fair use doctrine. What of 
actual ones? In the US, the home of fair use, the exception has indeed 
expanded in recent years. A series of cases, notably cases concerning the 
Google Books and Google Images services, have expanded the concept of 
‘transformative use’ to encompass uses of works that do not produce new 
works, but rather new ways of distributing and accessing them. Professor 
Samuelson describes this new kind of transformative uses as ‘orthogonal’, 
and Professor Ginsburg as ‘redistribution’ fair use.171 I will adopt 
Samuelson’s ‘orthogonal use’ label. 
The effectiveness of fair use exceptions in furthering goals such as 
diversity and inclusiveness is not necessarily straightforward. In expanding 
the transformative use doctrine, courts gave little attention to the structural 
landscape, and as a consequence have helped large online platforms such as 
Google to cement their dominance of the information environment. Let me 
briefly gloss the significance of ‘transformative’ use in the fair use calculus, 
before I explain the import of the expansion of the doctrine. 
There are four ‘fair use’ factors considered in determining whether a 
use falls under the fair use exception: 
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
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(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.172 
If the use of an existing work has ‘a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message’, and it does not 
‘merely supersede the objects’ of the original, then it is likely to be 
considered transformative.173The transformativeness of a use bears on both 
the first and fourth factor. 
Expanding the scope of what may be considered transformative 
therefore expands the scope of the fair use exception. What does the 
expansion entail? I will focus here on two cases: each concerning one of 
Google’s search services. 
In Perfect10 Inc. v Amazon.com Inc., the US 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the display on Google Images of thumbnail images, linking 
to pages on which those images were displayed, was a transformative use of 
the copyright works embodied in the images.174 The court held the use was 
transformative because the purpose of the original photos was ‘aesthetic’, 
whereas the search engine used the image as a pointer directing a user to a 
source of information.175 This was a departure from earlier authority which 
held that difference in purpose is not the same as transformation.176 The fact 
that, in making the use, the Google’s image search engine reproduced the 
whole image did not prevent the use from being considered 
transformative.177 
Nor did the commercial profitability of the use lead the court to give 
particular weight to the fourth fair use factor: the market harm factor. 
Google’s use of the images directed users to websites which had purchased 
advertising space through Google’s AdSense offering. The websites 
displayed infringing images. Google’s AdSense program was, at the time of 
the first instance decision in Perfect 10, worth $630 million: 46% of 
Google’s total revenues.178 Strangely, the court described Google’s use of 
the images as having only a ‘minor commercial aspect’.179 It went on to 
conclude that the mere commerciality of Google’s use could not be presumed 
to amount to market harm to the copyright owner, because market harm 
cannot be presumed in cases of transformative use. Insufficient evidence on 
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the question of whether users actually downloaded images from Google for 
which they would otherwise have had to pay led the court to hold that 
potential harm to Perfect 10’s market ‘remains hypothetical’; and the market 
harm factor therefore did not favor a finding of fair use.180 
In the Googlebooks case, Google’s unauthorized mass reproduction and 
digitization of library books for the purposes of creating a searchable 
database, which produced text ‘snippets’ in response to user searches, was 
also held to be a fair use.181 The court held the use of the works for a new 
purpose—enabling text search—was transformative in the sense intended by 
the court in Campbell.182 In other words, the court drew an equivalence 
between transformation of purpose and transformation in aesthetics, 
meaning or message. The transformativeness was more or less dispositive of 
the fair use question, even though Google arguably had commercial motives. 
The court noted that even if the purpose of copying is for a valuably 
transformative purpose, the product of the transformation might still be a 
market substitute for the copyright work. However, it emphasized the 
principle from Campbell that the more transformative the use, the less likely 
it is that the copies generated by way of the use will serve as a substitute for 
the copyright work, and the less likely will be a finding of market harm.183 
The Googlebooks court concluded that Google’s use could not rightly be 
considered to produce true market substitutes for copyright works, even if 
some sales would be lost as a result of snippets being available.184 
These cases are significant in a number of ways. They establish a 
precedent for treating mass unauthorized copying to facilitate the searching 
and browsing of works as transformative uses, even when the copying does 
not result in the creation of a new work of authorship, or new meanings, 
insights or aesthetics.185 Secondly, they established that courts’ findings on 
the first fair use factor (the nature of the use) bear heavily on the analysis of 
the fourth fair use factor. The fourth fair use factor is ‘the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’186 They 
institute a loose rule of thumb that if a use is transformative, it probably does 
not supersede the objects of the original work, and therefore is very unlikely 
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to operate as a market substitute for that work.187 The more specific 
implication of the cases is that where works are reproduced, even in full, for 
the purposes of data analysis and search technologies, courts will not assume 
an effect on the potential market for or value of the copyright works unless 
copyright owners lead specific evidence of actual market harm. 
The result is to establish an approach to the fourth fair use factor—the 
effect of a use on a copyright work’s potential market or value—in which 
the key issue is substitution on markets existing before the development of 
an attention-based economy online. Copyright owners are, in effect, deemed 
not to be entitled to profit from a search engine’s rendering their works more 
searchable, even when internet intermediaries profit directly or indirectly 
from the attention that they capture by making the works available in this 
way. 
On the one hand, these developments are good for inclusiveness and 
diversity, at least along some dimensions. The public’s power and 
entitlements in relation to the use of works is increased, and this is autonomy 
enhancing. Individuals’ and deliberating bodies’ capacity to find the precise 
parts of cultural artefacts relevant to their day to day concerns has grown. 
The range and diversity of books and images available for the public to 
search and browse has also grown. 
On the other hand, we should be careful not to lose sight of the broad, 
structural picture. If we confine our picture of copyright’s potential benefits 
to its supposed incentive effects, then there is little sense in extending 
copyright owners’ rights into markets which cannot reasonably be 
considered to have affected authors’ and publishers’ motivations in the first 
place, especially if the use in question provides a benefit to the public. 
Markets for searchable snippets of books, which did not exist at the time of 
creation or publishing, seem to fit this description. 
But my approach does not confine copyright’s benefits to its incentive 
effects. I am interested in substantive, structural effects. A simple example 
illustrates the point.  Libraries have to buy books in order to lend them to the 
public. Google, by contrast, is now not required to pay for their copying of 
books in order to render them searchable to the public.188 The result is that 
Google is at a structural advantage to libraries (and everybody else), when it 
comes to copying works. 
More broadly, the substantive, structural effect of the expansion of fair 
use in the orthogonal use cases is to allocate communicative power to 
 
     187.    See Ginsburg, supra note 171. 
 188.  Ginsburg, supra note 171 at 1411. 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
48 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. Vol 19:1 
dominant internet intermediaries. Those best placed to take advantage of the 
developments in fair use brought about by cases like Googlebooks are, 
unsurprisingly, dominant internet intermediaries like Google. Concentrating 
user attention on free content is extremely profitable for businesses like 
Google; not least because it permits the gathering of valuable data about 
those individuals that can then be used to sell advertising.189 It is businesses 
like Google, on that scale, which have the resources to conduct mass copying 
and data analysis exercises, extracting valuable data about the public in the 
process. It is businesses of that size that can be confident of having the 
resources to defend copyright suits and make a case for fair use. Smaller 
businesses are not on the same footing. We should not forget that the 
practical outcomes of Googlebooks was to furnish Google with a kind of 
monopoly; a first mover advantage against any potential competitors in the 
niche of online book search whose scruples or lack of resources prevented 
them from digitizing books without permission. 
Indeed, in earlier proceedings, the risk of Google’s obtaining a de facto 
monopoly over the digital market for millions of books was one of the 
grounds for rejecting a proposed settlement between Google and the 
plaintiffs.190 Under the settlement, Google would have paid license fees to 
copyright owners. If market power was a problem under a settlement where 
Google would have been paying license fees for its use, it is surely an even 
greater concern in the fair use, zero price scenario. 
My concerns about the networked information economy suggest we 
take care not to make cultural dominance too easy a feat for internet 
intermediaries.We should therefore resist treating orthogonal / redistribution 
uses of the kind in the Googlebooks and Google Images cases as 
transformative. In the US, this would mean returning to the position on 
transformative use set out in Infinity v Kirkwood. That is: copying works in 
such a way as to allow them to be used for a different purpose (such as 
research, or search), is not the same as transformation.191 
Professor Ginsburg, who sounded the alarm over the expansion of 
transformative use, has noted some indications of a movement in the 
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direction of Kirkwood, at least by the 2nd and 4th Circuit courts.192 Recent 
cases such as TCA Corp. v. McCollum and Brammer v Violent Hues show 
courts more willing to challenge and reject claims of orthogonal use 
transformativeness, especially when the purpose is clearly commercial.193 
This is a promising development, and courts should continue to subject 
claims of orthogonal transformativeness to heightened scrutiny. 
 We should also not allow transformative use to predominate too much 
in determining questions of fair use. A finding of transformation should not 
unduly prejudice findings regarding the fourth fair use factor: the effect on 
the potential market for or value of the original work. 
Courts should also adopt a broader interpretation of that factor. A use 
can be transformative, but at the same time, treating it as fair might allocate 
power, wealth and resources away from copyright owners, or 
disproportionately toward internet intermediaries in comparison with 
copyright owners, and indeed the general public. 
The fourth fair use factor requires courts to assess the effect of the use 
not only on the ‘potential market for’ the copyrighted work, but also the 
‘value of’ that work. Ginsburg points out that ‘value of’ has a distinct 
meaning from ‘potential market for’ and warns against interpreting the two 
tautologically.194 She explains that works may also serve as a ‘draw’ through 
which businesses might derive other forms of value.195 
There is at least one case, she observes, which adopts this approach to 
the fourth fair use factor: Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, 
Inc.196 There, the third circuit observed that, for the purposes of the fourth 
fair use factor, the ‘value of’ a film trailer need not only be understood in 
terms of direct income from the trailer. It could also encompass the value 
derived from advertising, cross-marketing and cross-selling other products, 
and obtaining valuable marketing information from visitors who view the 
trailer on webpages to which it was legitimately licensed. 
This is a promising authority. Following this line of reasoning, I would 
argue that uncompensated use of copyright works for the purposes of 
creating searchable indices that themselves serve as a ‘draw’ for attention 
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harvesting deprives copyright owners of value that they might hope to derive 
from such activities themselves. Uses of the kind deemed to be fair in the 
orthogonal use cases may increase the amount of time users spend on internet 
intermediaries’ platforms or applications, or provide valuable data about user 
preferences, or facilitate the sale of advertisements. Surely this is an ‘effect 
on the value’ of the work: an exploitation of the works capacity to serve as a 
‘draw’ of the kind Ginsburg describes. Such uses should therefore not 
continue to be treated as fair in future. 
In the case of such uses, value is allocated toward internet 
intermediaries (and arguably away from copyright owners). The European 
Commission described that flow of wealth and power as a ‘value gap’, 
whereby copyright owners do not obtain a ‘fair share’ of the value that other 
businesses, like internet intermediaries, derive from the use of their works 
online.197 For my purposes, the broader question is not whether the 
distribution of value is fair in a deontological sense, but rather whether it 
fosters an inclusive distribution of communicative power and opportunity in 
the information environment. Still, the metaphor of a ‘value gap’ captures 
the inclusiveness problems associated with orthogonal uses rather well. 
Given the immense commercial value of attention harvesting and data 
aggregation, the implication of the orthogonal use cases - that the copyright 
owners do not have a legitimate interest in the revenue derived from such 
activities, or that they would not expect to profit from their works in such a 
way - now seems premature. Having that value captured by dominant 
platforms, without having a say, seems a clear and negative effect on the 
value of copyright owners’ works. 
If we get beyond the incentive narrative, and think in broader, structural 
terms, there is more to consider than merely whether a copyright owner was 
motivated by the prospect of exploiting her work in a particular market. If 
we adopt the values of the cultural turn, we care less about optimizing 
incentives, and more about optimizing for inclusiveness and diversity. 
This calls for a broader, more purposive, interpretation of the fourth fair 
use factor. That factor should not be addressed by reference to a narrow 
question, ‘is the copyright owner’s market harmed’? Instead, courts should 
ask the broader question, ‘is the effect on the potential market for, or value 
of, the work fair.’ A broad consideration of fairness would take into account 
 
 197.  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market—COM (2016) 593. But see regarding the value gap, see Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 
DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 127–136 (2019). She points out (at 129) how much copyright 
industries are to blame for their weak bargaining power vis a vis large platforms, due to their own 
lengthy delay in supplying works in convenient formats and attractive prices online. 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
2019 The Disappointments of Networks 51 
existing constellations of power and privilege, and the likely effect of 
applying the exception, in deciding what is fair. 
Where a use clearly contributes to the ‘value gap’ – a significant effect 
on the ‘value of’ the work - courts should be more cautious about treating it 
as fair. They should take care to include the work’s value as a ‘draw’ in their 
consideration of the fourth fair use factor (and copyright owners should take 
care to lead evidence as to this attention-harvesting value when litigating fair 
use issues). The commerciality or attention-harvesting character of the use, 
should not, of course, lead to a presumption of unfairness, but it should be 
given due attention in the application of the fair use factors. 
2.2.2 Proposed further expansions of fair use 
With a clearer sense now of the ways in which even relatively narrow 
expansions of fair use may amplify the power of dominant internet platforms, 
let us now turn to the more radical proposals described at the beginning of 
this section. 
Let us start with the recommendation of including all imaginative uses 
within the purview of fair use. The benefit of extending fair use further, to 
encompass all imaginative uses of works is obviously that it would distribute 
the right to engage with works creatively in a far more inclusive way. But, 
like the expansion of transformative use doctrine to encompass orthogonal 
uses, this expansion of fair use would involve trade-offs. 
As with orthogonal uses, internet platforms that profit from attracting 
‘eyeballs’ and collecting data are well served by treating all imaginative uses 
as fair and non-infringing of copyright. Proliferation of non-commercial, 
imaginative uses of works would presumably drive traffic on internet 
intermediaries’ platforms, and traffic is their currency. Concentrating user 
attention on free content is extremely profitable for businesses like Google; 
not least because it permits the gathering of valuable data about those 
individuals that can then be used to sell advertising, or even for the purposes 
of propaganda. They profit and develop the information asymmetries 
described in the previous part, not only on the back of copyright works 
themselves, but also from the public’s creative engagements with copyright 
works. 
It is businesses like Google, on that scale, which have the resources to 
conduct mass copying and data analysis exercises, extracting valuable data 
about the public in the process. It is businesses of that size that can be 
confident of having the resources to defend copyright suits and make a case 
for fair use. Smaller businesses are not on the same footing. Structural 
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asymmetries would compound. That would an indirect structural 
consequence of treating all imaginative uses as fair. 
What about the direct consequences? It is not clear, even where direct 
consequences are concerned, that a broad ‘imaginative use’ exception would 
in every case involve a redistribution of cultural power away from large 
commercial organizations and toward individual authors or non-commercial 
users of works. 
It would not always be the ‘little man’ who would benefit from relying 
on the exceptions. Commercial businesses might, by applying a minimum of 
creative imagination to works created by amateurs or independent authors, 
find themselves in a position where they could profit without paying authors. 
There are already examples of successful commercial publications like 
Buzzfeed disregarding copyright and reproducing and publishing 
photographs and other works created by amateurs, in ‘listicles’ without 
attribution or authorization.198 And Facebook already derives enormous 
profits from using all of the content, created by all of its users, without 
payment to them. 
An ‘imaginative use’ exception therefore seems to me just as likely to 
produce a less inclusive distribution of communicative power as to produce 
a more inclusive one, even if on its face, it would give formal recognition to 
a universal right of free imagination. 
As for the recommendation of an inverted burden of proof in fair use, 
this would at first glance appear to empower the public vis-à-vis copyright 
owners. The right to use works, especially for non-commercial purposes, 
would appear to be very inclusively distributed under such an arrangement. 
At a structural level, however, such a development would be liable to 
compound inequalities in communicative power and opportunity. 
Fair use exceptions are already problematic in so far as their application 
is uncertain. In the face of uncertainty about whether any given use is fair, 
wealthy, established businesses can afford to pay for copyright advice, and 
even to risk copyright infringement. They can defend a suit or respond to a 
threat of litigation effectively. Moreover, risk-averse, established 
commercial copyright owners are better placed than independent authors or 
ordinary individuals to pay license fees. If they do not wish to take the risk 
that a use may be held not to be a fair use, they can simply price in copyright 
 
 198.  Joe Veix, BuzzFeed Stole My Article, So I’m Stealing it Back, DEATH AND TAXES, 
http://www.deathandtaxesmag.com/207291/buzzfeed-stole-my-article-so-im-stealing-it-back/. (last 
visited Apr 30, 2014); Dan Catt, 10 Good Reasons BuzzFeed Is Going to Pay My Invoice for Copyright 
Theft, SLATE, 2013, http://www.slate.com/. (last visited Apr 30, 2014). 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
2019 The Disappointments of Networks 53 
license fees. Independent authors, smaller content businesses or ordinary 
members of the public do not have the same security.199 
Now, inverting the burden of proof in fair use does not remove the 
uncertainty. It does, however, increase copyright enforcement costs. Raising 
the marginal cost of copyright enforcement may reduce some enforcement 
action, and therefore decrease the risk of engaging creatively with copyright 
works – which is a structural gain for inclusiveness. But the effect of this 
increase in enforcement cost / decrease in risk for creative engagement with 
works is not flat. It is likely to impact copyright owners and users differently, 
and one key vector of difference will be the resources available to them. 
All enforcement or defense costs will favor incumbents in creative 
industries over newcomers, powerful and wealthy operators over smaller 
ones. This is one of the key insights of the cultural turn, and the 
‘concentration critique’ of copyright that I mentioned in the introduction to 
this article. 
Wealthy commercial media businesses are at an advantage in obtaining 
and enforcing rights, over independent creators, smaller businesses, and non-
commercial creator-users. Copyright industry incumbents can afford to 
enforce their copyrights through legal action; and can afford to pay license 
fees when they need to use others’ copyrights. 
Moreover, highly integrated media conglomerates will already have a 
large body of material over which they have copyrights: and which they can 
therefore re-use without having to pay license fees. The more extensive their 
commercial infrastructure (of marketing and market intelligence, for 
example), the greater their advantage in exploiting digital technology to 
engage in price discrimination and strategic product bundling.200 
The same may not be said for newer entrants to the market, for whom 
search and transaction costs of licensing (not to mention the actual license 
fees) may be prohibitive.201 Copyright causes these costs, and in this respect 
may be said to discourage diverse and robust engagements with existing 
material. 
Worse, the cost of enforcing copyright hits small-time authors and 
publishers the hardest—so their capacity to derive copyright revenue is 
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severely curtailed in comparison with larger businesses.202The asymmetry in 
enforcement power only compounds the advantage of larger, more 
established copyright businesses. Big commercial intermediaries are well 
positioned to ensure they make money from their copyright; independent 
authors and small copyright businesses are not. The upshot is that 
inclusiveness and diversity are likely to suffer, since one specific group 
(large scale media producers, ownership of which is highly concentrated) 
enjoys a substantial advantage over the rest of the potentially communicating 
public.203 
These insights bear on the question of whether to raise copyright 
enforcement costs by inverting the onus of proof with respect to fair use. The 
higher the costs of enforcing copyright, the more incumbents and large 
businesses are at an advantage relative to independent authors and 
publishers. An inverted burden of proof may increase the security of creative 
re-users of works relative to copyright owners. However, as between 
incumbent, wealthy copyright owners, and smaller scale copyright owners 
(who are, incidentally, more likely to be independent authors, rather than 
intermediary businesses), it is likely to entrench their already existing 
disparity in communicative power. 
For all these reasons, it is better not to treat all imaginative uses as fair, 
or to invert the burden of proof in fair use. The transformativeness of a use 
already weighs very significantly in the fair use calculus, and this gives 
imaginative uses of works considerable prospects of being fair. But the other 
fair use factors must also be given proper consideration, because otherwise, 
the distributive consequences of any given use fail to register. In other words, 
while the fair use exception in its current form does give rise to some 
uncertainty, it is preferable to a fair use doctrine that turned only on the 
question of the users’ imaginative contribution, or in which there was an 
inverted burden of proof. 
2.3 Platform liability and content filtering 
So much for my analysis of the structural significance of expanding 
copyright exceptions and limitations. What about expanding copyright 
owners’ rights? 
Let me now turn to a controversial measure which is explicitly 
calculated to enhance copyright owners’ rights with respect to dominant 
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online platforms, and to redress the ‘value gap’ described above.204 As I said, 
the purpose of doing so is to show that my structural approach does not 
necessarily mandate copyright ‘maximalism’. Efforts to ‘strengthen’ the 
position of copyright owners vis-a-vis online platforms, and to expand the 
scope of copyright owners’ exclusive rights, may, perversely, further cement 
the communicative and cultural power of dominant online platforms. They 
may also entrench existing market hierarchies that characterize copyright-
based content economies. 
The European Union’s Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market introduces a number of copyright reforms. Article 17 (Article 13 in 
earlier drafts of the directive) is one of the most controversial.205 Article 17 
provides that member states of the European Union must legislate so that 
for-profit online content-sharing service providers (e.g. video sharing 
websites like YouTube) will be liable as publishers of the content posted by 
their users. They will now be required to obtain copyright licenses in order 
to continue to host copyright content posted by their users. 
Safe harbor exceptions, which previously applied to online services 
which operated as a ‘mere conduit’ for the posting of copyright content will 
no longer apply in relation to these content-sharing platforms. An alternative, 
sui generis notice and takedown regime will, however, permit content-
sharing platforms to avoid liability with respect to infringing content if they 
can show they have: 
• made best efforts to secure a copyright license; 
• made best efforts (in accordance with high industry standards) 
to ensure the unavailability of specific works and subject matter 
identified by copyright rightsholders; 
• acted expeditiously to remove infringing content on receiving 
sufficiently substantiated notice from rightsholders; and 
• made best efforts to prevent future uploads of such content. 
There is certainly a prima facie structural case for making content sharing 
platforms liable for infringing content posted by their users. There is merit 
in trying to remediate the ‘value gap’. But the strength of the structural case 
for Article 17 will ultimately depend on how the process of licensing 
copyright content to platforms plays out. 
I will reflect here on possible outcomes of this process. The object of 
doing so is not to attempt to predict exactly how Article 17 will affect the 
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cultural landscape, nor to analyze exhaustively the precise doctrinal or 
practical details of regimes that might emerge under Article 17. Rather, it is 
to illustrate the structural issues at stake, and the ways in which they should 
inform our thinking about such measures. 
2.3.1 The most hopeful possibility for the implementation of Article 
17 
Let us begin with the most hopeful possibility. One possible outcome 
of Article 17 is that most platforms conclude copyright licenses with most 
copyright owners, with respect to most or all of the content which users post 
to those platforms. If this comes about, then Article 17 would in some 
measure mitigate the problem of concentration of wealth and communicative 
power in the hands of dominant online platforms. Given the vast amount of 
material uploaded to platforms like YouTube, this would likely require some 
form of blanket or collective licensing (a point I will return to). A licensing 
regime that effectively covered all content posted on user generated 
platforms distribute communicative power and wealth more evenly between 
platforms, copyright owners, and end-users. Platforms would share some of 
their wealth with copyright owners, while end-users would still be free to 
participate in the marketplace of ideas and enjoy the experience of creative 
appropriation. 
In this very positive scenario, there would also be improvements to the 
incentive structures that shape the investment of time and resources into 
creative content. Currently, there is no clear incentive for copyright 
businesses to distribute content in formats which facilitate non-commercial 
end-users to ‘remix’ it or otherwise creatively engage with it.206 Indeed, 
proponents of the cultural turn have worried a great deal about copyright 
owners using technological protection measures to prevent legitimate 
creative re-uses of works.207 If copyright owners could reliably expect to 
derive good licensing revenue from user generated content platforms, 
however, they would have an incentive to facilitate, rather than block 
creative uses. 
Expected license revenue from user creativity might produce a more 
economically rational management of resources, which better aligned 
 
 206.  But see David Lindsay, Franchises, Imaginary Worlds, Authorship and Fandom, LAW AND 
CREATIVITY IN THE AGE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT FRANCHISE, at 66, where he argues that copyright 
businesses have an interest in engaging fans in an ‘exchange of meanings’ and cultivating creative uses 
of copyright works by fans. 
 207.  See e.g Fisher III, supra note 2 at 1233; Lessig, supra note 2 at 62; Netanel, supra note 2 at 
66-70. 
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copyright owner incentives with the value that end-users derive from 
engaging creatively with works.208 The benefits of this would go beyond the 
merely economic. If copyright businesses can make more money from 
providing content in formats that makes creative re-use easy, they would be 
more likely to supply works in those formats. This in turn would reduce 
existing friction for creative re-use of works: the friction generated by the 
inconvenience of formats that do not lend themselves to users’ creative 
engagement. 
For example, record labels do not tend to release the unmastered ‘stems’ 
making up sound recordings. Instead, they release fully mastered tracks in 
stereo. The casual remixer has two tracks to play with rather than then 8, 10, 
or 20 that have been mixed and mastered together to create the final mastered 
recording. This means that the casual, non-commercial remixer is not well 
positioned to extract single tracks—say a baseline or drumbeat—and do 
something creative with them. If record labels could reliably make licensing 
revenue from fan remixes and mashups posted on user generated platforms, 
they might be more open to releasing stems. There is, in other words, a 
potential for tremendous gains in inclusiveness. 
2.3.2 A more pessimistic view of Article 17 
Unfortunately, the prospect of all platforms achieving successful 
licensing deals with all copyright owners, with respect to all content 
uploaded by users, seems fairly remote—at least if the licensing process is 
left to private ordering. Platforms like YouTube and copyright owners have 
not hitherto managed comprehensive licensing deals. Merely increasing the 
leverage of copyright owners by holding platforms liable for infringing 
content posted by users is not a sure path to bringing about such deals. 
What seems likely is that platforms and copyright owners will achieve 
some patchwork of licensing deals covering some but not all content posted 
by users. Various possible scenarios spring to mind. 
In one scenario, online user generated content platforms such as 
YouTube might successfully conclude licenses with large multimedia large 
multimedia organizations, but not with smaller scale creators and content 
businesses. The latter will be lower in their list of priorities and dealing with 
each successively will at the very least take a very long time, and involve 
high transaction costs. 
 
 208.  For a useful gloss of the theory that copyright’s role is to facilitate, above all, economically 
rational management of creative resources, see e.g. A. Barron, Copyright infringement,’free-riding’ and 
the lifeworld, LSE LAW, SOCIETY AND ECONOMY WORKING PAPERS 17/2008 at 14 (2008).  
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In another scenario, platforms like YouTube might fail to secure 
licenses for a significant proportion of copyright material which their users 
tend to upload without authorization; or there might be a delay while licenses 
were negotiated; perhaps a delay of years. Much about these scenarios seem 
to me quite problematic from a structural point of view. 
The first scenario would be a win of sorts for end users, because it 
would mean that their non-commercial creative engagements with a large 
body of content (the commercial catalogues of big content owners) could 
proceed without risk of blocking or takedown. 
Smaller content providers and independent creators would seem, 
however, to be at a substantial disadvantage in the licensing of their material 
to online platforms. They would likely have less negotiating power, less 
know-how in the business of licensing, and less time and resources to devote 
to securing licenses with platforms than the larger players. disparities in 
bargaining power translate into disparities in communicative power. 
Assuming success in licensing content to large online platforms correlates 
roughly to the size and bargaining power of content businesses, we could 
expect smaller players either not  to make any money at all from user 
generated content (if they haven’t concluded licenses) or making less money 
(assuming they conclude less favorable licenses than larger players). If they 
haven’t concluded licenses, they will have costs that larger businesses do 
not, because they will need to spend time and money on copyright claims or 
takedown notices. 
In other words, smaller businesses will likely derive less copyright 
income from licenses with user generated content platforms than larger 
business and have higher copyright enforcement costs. That means less 
money and time to spend on creating and disseminating content; which 
means less voice. In other words, we are likely to see existing cultural and 
communicative hierarchies continue in a scenario where platforms conclude 
licenses with large copyright businesses preferentially to small copyright 
businesses. The ‘concentration problem’ in the political economy of 
copyright, of which cultural turn theorists are so critical, would be likely to 
persist. 
The second scenario is more worrying still. This is the scenario where 
platforms do not obtain suitable copyright licenses for a very large 
proportion of content, or at least experience a delay in obtaining licenses. In 
this scenario, platforms would be obliged to take down infringing material, 
upon receiving a proper notice from the copyright owner, and to use best 
efforts and ‘industry standard’ measure to remove and prevent new uploads 
of infringing content also concerning. 
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Earlier drafts of Art. 17 specifically suggested the use of content filters 
and blockers as a means of meeting the best efforts and industry standard 
requirements.209 It is not unreasonable to expect that this is what will be 
required to meet the ‘high industry standards’. Given the sheer amount of 
content posted by users, the most straightforward way for platforms to avoid 
liability for infringing content is to use upload filters to prevent the posting, 
especially with respect to content for which they have already received 
takedown notices. 
Even if Art. 17 does not, in its final form, mandate the use of content 
blocking and upload filters, the imposition of liability on platforms creates a 
strong pressure to implement such measures. Essentially, Art. 17 creates a 
notice and takedown regime similar to existing regimes such as that applying 
under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, but with additional 
problems associated with content blocking, and a higher risk of liability for 
online platforms. 
Let me first deal with the implications of making platforms responsible 
for active content blocking, before I turn to ways in which notice and 
takedown regimes tend to allocate power as between incumbent content 
businesses, and newcomers or smaller players. 
By making platforms liable for infringing content posted by users, 
Article 17 makes them responsible for active content gatekeeping. It is not 
clear to me that this produces a net reduction in the structural asymmetries 
that exist between dominant content platforms, and everyone else, when it 
comes to cultural and communicative power. In the previous part, I showed 
that dominant online platforms already exercise a form of curatorial power 
over the contents of a very large portion of the marketplace of ideas. Placing 
direct responsibility for removing and blocking harmful content in their 
hands seems likely to further entrench them as gatekeepers and curators. 
Platform gatekeeping, especially automated content blocking, tends to 
involve fairly arbitrary judgments about whether certain content is infringing 
(or harmful, or fake news, or whatever)—especially if blocking is automated. 
Dominant online platforms have no particular reason to exercise their 
enormous power in the public interest. They are, of course, not inherently 
malevolent, but they are beholden to shareholders and the businesses that 
buy data and ad space from them. Free expression, diversity and 
inclusiveness are not their priorities, and they are not the priorities of 
automate content filtering and blocking algorithms. 
 
 209.  See e.g. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright 
in the Digital Single Market—COM (2016)593, Art. 13. 
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There is another structural wrinkle, which complicates matters further. 
The current leaders in content identification, filtering and blocking 
technology happen to be Google, or rather, Alphabet, the company that owns 
Google. Alphabet owns YouTube, which implements a system called 
ContentID. ContentID identifies when video and audio content has been 
reproduced. Currently, copyright owners can choose what happens when a 
work uploaded to YouTube by another user triggers a ContentID match with 
their copyright work. They can either block matching content, share some of 
the advertising revenue with the uploader of the matching video, or simply 
monitor the video’s viewership statistics.210 Alphabet has invested more than 
$100 million in the development of Content ID’s and the technology is 
already used by more than 9,000 copyright owners and content businesses 
globally. 211 
So, while the introduction of various forms of content of blocking and 
upload filtering is likely to be disruptive to YouTube, they have a sufficient 
buffer to withstand the disruption, and already have the infrastructure to 
implement these measures. Not so, the smaller players in the online-content 
sharing universe, such as the artwork community DeviantArt or 
controversial social media sites such as 4Chan and VOAT.212  If they are to 
implement content blocking technology, they will probably have to pay 
already-dominant platforms for the privilege.213 So money and power flows 
away from smaller sites toward the larger platforms. 
There is already an oligopoly over the means of filtration for the 
purposes of finding and ordering content. It seems quite possible that 
implementing direct forms of content regulation which require or encourage 
content filtering would result in a monopoly or oligopoly over the means for 
filtration for the purposes of blocking content, as less-dominant platforms 
were forced to rely on filtering technologies developed by larger ones. This 
 
 210.  How Content ID works - YouTube Help,  
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en. (last visited Aug 8, 2019). 
 211.  Gian Volpicelli, Don’t Believe the Hype: Article 13 is Great News for YouTube, WIRED UK, 
2019, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/article-13-youtube-what-next. (last visited May 2, 2019). 
 212.  Id. See also Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A 
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019). 
 213.  Article 17(5) does contain a ‘proportionality principle’, which brings into consideration 
matters such as the size of a content-sharing service, the availability and cost of suitable and effective 
means of taking down and preventing the upload of content. However, if Alphabet made software such 
as ContentID commercially available for a reasonable cost, smaller platforms might not be able to avoid 
content blocking obligations merely on the basis of their size and the relative cost of such measures. 
There would therefore be strong pressure on these platforms to pay Alphabet for a license to ContentID 
or some related software. In other words, if the effect of Article 17 is to pressure online content-sharing 
platforms into content blocking as a matter of standard practice, the result might be to further compound 
the structural advantages of dominant online platforms. 
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would be bad for inclusiveness and diversity of voices in the marketplace of 
ideas. 
Let us turn now to the effect of content blocking and filtering on the 
distribution of communicative power as between copyright businesses and 
users (leaving aside, for a moment, the issue of concentration of cultural 
power in the hands of dominant platforms). A recent case study of contested 
takedown notices on YouTube, documented in a series of articles on the 
IPKat blog, illustrates some of these problems well. 
A popular YouTuber, with the moniker MumboJumbo, received a 
torrent of automated takedown notices with respect to his videos, which 
contained 4 seconds of sampled music at the beginning and end. To 
complicate matters, the sample is not a sound recording owned by the 
claimant (Warner Chappell), but instead itself contains a sample from a 
recording in which the claimant own copyright. Claims arrived in Mumbo 
Jumbo’s email inbox at a rate of 30 per minute, with a total of 400 claims.214 
Let us leave aside the legal merits of any of the notices and, instead, 
consider day to day practicalities. Let us assume that some or all of Mumbo 
Jumbo’s videos do not in fact infringe copyright. Unfortunately for Mumbo 
Jumbo, he cannot defend or dispute the claims automatically, or deal with 
them at anything like the speed at which they arrived. Any effort to contest 
claims, or even remove the offending content in the interim, must on his part 
be manual. He describes the process of responding to claims as follows: 
“myself and my girlfriend, Vicky have been going through all of my videos 
on the YouTube Editor and manually removing all of the intros.” Then he 
has to file individual disputes for each claim using YouTube’s dispute 
resolution mechanism. According to him, each such effort takes one or two 
minutes. As a consequence, disputing all the claims could take him up to 
twelve hours: a full workday for his one-man content business.215 
The Mumbo Jumbo story illustrates, first of all, that the notice and take 
down procedure may be abused; or even used in good faith, but in such a 
way as to target uses that ought to be considered non-infringing. It is 
extremely difficult to calibrate filters in such a way as to prevent lawful 
content from being blocked along with unlawful content. For example, we 
cannot reliably expect an automated blocking filter to be able to recognize 
uses of copyright work that should properly be considered to be fair dealing 
or fair use—such as parody, satire or other transformative uses. 
 
 214.  Thomas Key, Sampling Mumbo Jumbo: Minecraft YouTuber Receives Copyright Claims on 
Hundreds of Videos in a Matter of Hours, THE IPKAT, http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/06/sampling-
mumbo-jumbo-minecraft-youtuber.html. (last visited Jun 7, 2019). 
 215.  Id. 
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The story also shows how small content businesses are at a 
disadvantage to larger ones when it comes to contesting take down notices, 
and otherwise dealing with situations where filters or content removal 
systems takedown or block content. Granted, both existing DMCA 
procedure, and the procedures that would be implemented by the EU 
directive, leave scope for appealing and reversing take downs on the basis 
that the content in question does not infringe copyright, or falls under an 
exception such as fair use or fair dealing. 
But those without the wherewithal to understand their rights under such 
exceptions are liable simply to concede to a takedown notice, even where it 
pertains to a use that is not in fact infringing. The people likely to be in this 
situation are individual, independent authors and non-commercial users. It is 
likely, then, that the least profitable uses—by individual users—are the most 
readily subjected to enforcement. Even if they do contest notices, as Mumbo 
Jumbo did, the time cost of going through the procedure for doing so hits 
small operators the hardest. 
Now, simply raising barriers to making copyright claims or issuing 
takedown notices does not necessarily resolve the problem satisfactorily. 
YouTube’s copyright claims policy is not all calibrated in favor of copyright 
owners. The platform has recently revised its copyright system for manual 
copyright claims.216 Claimants must now specify the portion of videos 
alleged to be infringing with a timestamp. The benefit of this requirement is 
that alleged infringers will be better placed to defend against spurious claims. 
The problem is, the measure will increase copyright enforcement costs. 
Issuing a takedown notice or claim on a platform’s claim system is, to be 
sure, cheaper than full-blown copyright litigation, even with the additional 
step of including a time stamp. But a less acute version of the enforcement 
cost and concentration problems (which I described in discussing fair use 
above) still persists under notice and take down regimes. 
The structural consequences are predictable. Independent creators and 
small content businesses are the least well placed to submit a compliant 
notice in order to get genuinely infringing content taken down; while larger 
players have more resources to devote to the continuous work of finding 
infringing content and issuing takedown notices. At the same time, 
YouTube, is taking control of how copyright works (de facto if not de jure), 
thus arrogating another form of cultural power to itself, and away from 
policy-makers who are accountable to the public. 
 
 216.  Thomas Key, Guest Post: YouTube Shifts the Burden: Requires Manual Copyright Claimants 
to Timestamp the Allegedly Infringing Material; Simplifies the Rectification Process - The IPKat, 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/07/guest-post-youtube-shifts-burden.html. (last visited Aug 8, 2019).  
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS OF NETWORKS 12/23/2019  12:03 AM 
2019 The Disappointments of Networks 63 
2.3.3 The challenge for implementing Article 17 
The challenge for EU members states in implementing Article 17 is to 
ensure that licensing of content plays out as closely to ‘the most hopeful 
possibility’ that I described above. The outcome to aim for is one in which 
as much content as possible—preferably all content—is licensed, on 
basically the same terms for all copyright owners. 
Now, the copyright directive does leave the door open to such an 
outcome. Article 12 of the directive provides that EU member states may 
extend the operation of licensing agreements concluded by collective 
management organizations (on behalf of member copyright owners) to apply 
to copyright rightsholders who have not themselves authorized those 
organizations to act on their behalf. This extension of licensing agreements 
is only permissible when obtaining individual authorizations from 
rightsholders is so impractical and onerous as to make licensing by way of 
private ordering unlikely.217 Another key condition is that all rightsholders 
should be guaranteed equal treatment, including in relation to the terms of 
the license. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the details of practically 
implementing such a licensing regime. What is of interest here are the 
broader structural issues at play. Let me briefly sketch them out. 
The case of content uploaded on user generated content platforms 
would seem to fit squarely within the set of limited circumstances 
contemplated by Article 12. As I have been arguing, it would be very 
difficult for platforms to obtain licenses for every piece of content posted by 
users; and the difficulty would seem to be the most severe with respect to 
content owned by copyright owners with the fewest resources.218 
In effect, measures implemented by EU member states under article 12 
would overcome this difficulty by putting in place a form of compulsory, 
blanket licensing, administered by collective rights management 
organizations. Extended or compulsory licenses of this kind seem to be a 
promising avenue for balancing the range of structural problems that I have 
been considering in this article. 
A successful implementation of Article 12, with respect to rights on 
content posted on user generated platforms, has the potential to ameliorate, 
to some degree, some of the imbalance of wealth and power derived from 
the exploitation of content online. It has the potential to ameliorate the 
 
 217.  Art 12(2). 
   218.    See also Samuelson and Hashimoto, supra note 212 at 111. 
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concentration problem produced by both copyright and by free content 
economies online. 
A licensing regime under Article 12 could operate to share with 
copyright owners some of the concentrated wealth and communicative 
power accrued by dominant internet platforms through the exploitation of 
copyright works. Such a licensing regime could disrupt, in some measure, 
the zero-price content model which helps to underwrite that dominance.219 
By guaranteeing remuneration for copyright owners, it would help to furnish 
them with the means to maintain some independence and voice in the broader 
cultural and discursive sphere, and help to ensure the persistence of multiple 
nodes of communicative power in the public sphere.220 
Extended collective licensing under Article 12 might also go some way 
to remediating copyright’s concentration problem, which arises in part as a 
result of the asymmetrical impact of the costs of licensing, enforcing 
copyright, and defending copyright claims. It could help to neutralize the 
relative advantage of incumbents over newcomers and smaller copyright 
owners, because receiving copyright income would no longer be dependent 
on having the wherewithal to conclude profitable licensing agreements or to 
take effective copyright enforcement action.  
Likewise, the specter of automated content blocking, and all of its 
associated problems, could be avoided. As I have pointed out, the costs of 
automated content blocking are likely to be distributed asymmetrically. If all 
content posted on platforms would, as a matter of course, fall under an 
extended collective license, this asymmetry would become irrelevant, 
because there would be no need to block content. By the same token, the 
frictions standing in the way of users engaging creatively with copyright 
content would be reduced, which would be a win for inclusiveness. 
I do not intend to suggest that Article 12, or compulsory licensing 
regimes for content on user generated content platforms, will solve all the 
structural problems appurtenant to copyright markets or online information 
economies. On brief consideration, however, such regimes do seem 
promising vehicles for dealing with some of the structural problems that I 
have been discussing. At the very least, there is a case for further 
consideration and analysis of such measures, applying a qualitative, 
structural approach of the kind that I have advocated in this article. 
  
 
 219.  See above, part 1.4. 
 220.  Netanel emphasizes the need for ‘bubbles of varied wealth and power’ to maintain robust 
public discourse, and to prevent a small group of dominant voices from drowning out the rest. See 
Netanel, Market Hierarchy, supra note 14 at 1919-1920. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past 25 years, the cultural turn in copyright scholarship has 
amply demonstrated that there is more to copyright than merely balancing 
incentives to create against the need for access to works. The qualitative, 
cultural effects of the law matter. If we truly believe that copyright law 
should be calibrated to promote ‘progress’, then we should take into account 
its effects on the distribution of cultural and communicative power; on 
democratic discourse and individual self-authorship; and on the 
inclusiveness and diversity of the cultural milieu. The cultural turn has 
produced a rich and productive normative framework for evaluating the legal 
and institutional parameters that organize and shape creative activity. 
If we take this framework seriously, however, we are compelled to 
reconsider the combination of copyright pessimism and internet optimism 
that has been characteristic of cultural turn thinking. Proponents of the 
cultural turn who were concerned about copyright’s role in concentrating 
cultural power should also be concerned about the concentration problems 
in online information economies in which copying and sharing proceeds 
more freely. If they were concerned that the commercial incentives under 
copyright regimes privileged bland and homogeneous content, they should 
also be concerned about the troubling incentives in play in online extractive 
attention economies. 
It is not my intention, having described some of the more dystopian 
features of the networked communication environment, to write off its 
benefits entirely. Not everything about the internet is tarnished by the race 
to capture attention, and by the concentration of platform ownership. Clearly 
there are benefits to facilitating wide, low-cost participation in culture and 
discourse, and in disrupting existing mass market structures of 
communicative power. There are more works in circulation, and more people 
who can create, access them and use them, more easily (more inclusiveness). 
People are contributing to culture and discourse for more diverse audiences, 
and with a wider range of motivations (more diversity). 
I can hardly imagine researching and writing this article without 
Google’s remarkable search engine, its Google Scholar application, and its 
Googlebooks collection. I also came across many helpful news articles that 
I would otherwise never have seen in my Facebook and Twitter news feeds. 
The dominant internet applications of which I have been so relentlessly 
critical have undoubtedly helped me in my research and writing, and in that 
respect have enhanced my authorship (and self-authorship). 
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But the point I want to make is that the benefits of the ‘free’ networked 
communication environment are (like the democracy-enhancing features of 
the copyright-mediated communication sphere identified by Netanel) 
qualified and contingent. They are not guaranteed and universal. Creating 
conditions in which copying and sharing proceeds more freely, does not by 
itself prevent concentration of communicative power and attendant 
qualitative problems; and seems, in certain cases, to worsen these problems. 
There are trade-offs involved. This has hitherto been insufficiently 
acknowledged in copyright literature and scholarship. 
Both copyright and non-copyright systems produce inclusiveness and 
diversity problems, just as each has some advantages for inclusiveness and 
diversity. In both copyright markets and online non-copyright systems, 
perverse incentives reward bland or sensationalist content.  Both online and 
off, and in copyright and networked-peer-production systems, a small group 
of powerful platforms hold a disturbing amount of power of the contents and 
character of the marketplace of ideas. Developments in the law effect the 
broader organization of expressive activity and have the potential to entrench 
existing hierarchies and incentives; or to change them for the better. 
This may so whether they appear, on their face, to ‘weaken’ or to 
‘expand’ the strength or scope of copyright. As I’ve shown, expanding 
exceptions such as fair use, which would seem to enhance the 
communicative and creative opportunities of ordinary individuals, may at the 
same time help to increase the power of dominant internet platforms. That 
power is, in some respects, power over the very individuals whose creative 
horizons have been expanded: they trade off one gain in self-authorship 
against another kind of loss. By the same token, strengthening copyright 
owners’ formal exclusive rights with respect to online platforms may fail to 
meaningfully change the power dynamics as between copyright owners and 
platforms; or between incumbents and newcomers in content businesses. 
In assessing developments in copyright law, we should try to think 
afresh about existing structures of communicative power and opportunity 
across the whole cultural landscape, and the likely effects of regulatory 
intervention on those structures. Such an approach demands a unified picture 
of the structural and qualitative challenges that affect the marketplace of 
ideas and the cultural and creative spheres, whether under the auspices of 
copyright or in free content economies. 
The challenge for future scholarship is to better our understanding of 
where copyright fits into a broader information and cultural policy. We 
should try to work out how to bring copyright law, media ownership law and 
content regulation, competition law, internet law, and (of course) day to day 
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practice in line, working together to try to address asymmetries of cultural 
power, and their distorting effects on self-authorship and democracy. 
We may not be able to attain a ‘perfect’ cultural landscape (as if such a 
thing could exist). We should, however, build on the insights of the cultural 
turn: to work out where the public benefit lies; to understand it in rich 
qualitative terms; and to keep pursuing what improvements we can. We will 
need to remain open to continuous evaluation and adjustment of our 
expectations and about different systems for organizing creativity, even 
those which may once have seemed very promising, such as online free 
content economies. 
 
